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INTRODUCTIONCOMPETITION authorities are increasingly concerned about the
anticompetitive effects of deception.' In December 2009, for ex-
ample, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleged that In-
tel maintained its dominance in the worldwide microprocessor markets
by, among other things, engaging in a decade-long campaign of deceit.2
This followed the European Commission imposing a 1.06 billion fine,3
Intel's $1.25 billion antitrust settlement with its competitor,4 and the state
of New York's antitrust complaint.5 Among the various alleged deceptive
practices, Intel misrepresented industry benchmarks to favorably reflect
the performance of its central processing units relative to its competitors'
products, and it pressured independent software vendors to label their
products as compatible with Intel and not to similarly label the names or
logos of a competitor's products, even though these products were
compatible.6
A key issue is how the antitrust agencies and federal courts will evalu-
ate a monopolist's deception. The courts frequently address whether a
monopolist's deception violates the federal competition laws.7 But when
1. See, e.g., Susan A. Creighton, Cheap Exclusion: Deception as a Case Study, Hear-
ings before the Dep't of Justice and the FTC on Exclusionary Conduct 10 (Dec. 6, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/single-firm/docs/220348.pdf (former FTC official
testifying that deception and similar types of anticompetitive abuses "should be at the
heart of government enforcement of Section 2"); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Section 2 and Standard Setting: Rambus, N-Data & the Role of Causation (Oct.
2, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/081002section2rambusndata.pdf (noting how
deceptive single-firm conduct in the standard-setting context has been a priority for the
FTC for over a decade).
2. Complaint at 3, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (FTC filed Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.ftc.
gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf [hereinafter Intel Compl.]. Intel subsequently
settled with the FTC. Decision and Order, Intel Corp., No. 9341 (FTC filed Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100804intelagree.pdf. Sections VI, VII, and VIII of the
Proposed Consent Order prohibit, among other things, Intel from engaging in deception
related to its product road maps, its compilers, and its product benchmarking.
3. Summary of European Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Pro-
ceeding Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, 2009
O.J. (C 227) 13, 17, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:
227:0013:0017:EN:PDF.
4. Arik Hesseldahl, The Intel-AMD Settlement: A Play-by-Play, Bus. WK., Nov. 15,
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc20091115_692400.htm.
5. Complaint at 78, New York v. Intel Corp., No. 09-00827-JJF (D. Del. filed Nov.
4, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2009/nov/NYAG_v_Intel
COMPLAINTFINAL.pdf.
6. Intel Compl., supra note 2, at 10-11, 13.
7. In the United States, private plaintiffs bring most federal antitrust claims.
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JusICE STATISncs ONLINE tbl. 5.41 (2007), http://www.
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdflt5412007.pdf. The FTC survey of private Section 2 claims de-
cided between January 2000 and July 1, 2007 identified "Business Torts" as the third most
popular theory of liability (following "Other" and "Refusals to Deal With Non-Rivals"
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it comes to the legal standards to determine what is permissible or imper-
missible for a monopolist under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,8 courts
have yet to arrive at a workable legal standard that yields predictable
results. The courts employ different legal standards to evaluate a monop-
olist's deception involving advertising and product disparagement,
vaporware, standard-setting organizations, and other conduct.9 Even for
false advertising, the legal standards differ. Some courts, for example,
readily condemn a monopolist's deceptive advertising.' 0 Others presume
that deceptive advertising has a de minimis effect on competition.' One
court opined that deceptive advertising never violates the antitrust laws.12
Other countries' competition authorities have addressed this issue in-
frequently. But by recently settling a case involving deception to a stan-
dard-setting organization, the European Commission said it will continue
to investigate and intervene in such cases.' 3 So foreign competition agen-
cies must also decide what legal standard to employ. To promote greater
convergence on the legal standard, this Article examines a monopolist's
deception across different factual settings and provides a framework for
evaluating the monopolist's deception under the competition laws. Such
clarity is needed. Unlike other monopolistic practices that may or may
not be anticompetitive depending on the circumstances, deception is
rarely, if ever, procompetitive.14 But at times, a monopolist's deception,
while immoral, may not (or only remotely) impair competition, and thus
does not violate the competition laws.' 5 Even if deception affects compe-
tition, it may not contribute significantly to a firm's maintaining or attain-
ing monopoly power. At other times, deception raises significant
anticompetitive risks.16 In these cases, antitrust plaintiffs should be able
to prosecute this deception quickly (rather than ramble through the pro-
tracted litigation under antitrust's rule-of-reason standard).' 7
categories). William F. Adkinson, Jr. et al., Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Theory and Practice app., tbl. 1 (Nov. 3, 2008) (unpublished paper), http://ftc.gov/os/
sectiontwohearings/docs/section2overview.pdf.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).




13. Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Comm'n Accepts Commitments
from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip Royalty Rates, IP/09/1897 (Dec. 9, 2009), http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1897&format=HTML&aged=O
&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
14. See infra Part I.A-B.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (noting that
rule-of-reason standard involves a flexible factual inquiry into restraint's overall competi-
tive effect and "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed"); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977) ("Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in decid-
ing whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable re-
straint on competition."). See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason
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Part I of this Article discusses deception and its potential anticompeti-
tive effects. Since deception lacks any redeeming ethical, moral, or eco-
nomic justifications, and trust in the marketplace is paramount, multiple
laws seek to deter and punish deception. Part II discusses the legislative
aim of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the federal antitrust laws
seek to deter acts of unfair competition, which historically included a
competitor's deception, some federal courts, as Part III discusses, have
recently erected hurdles for antitrust plaintiffs injured by a monopolist's
deception. Such hurdles, as this Part discusses, are contrary to Section 2's
legislative aim, the common law antecedents of the Sherman Act, and
other congressional policies. Part IV proposes a "quick-look" legal stan-
dard for evaluating a monopolist's alleged deception. It addresses how
the standard promotes several rule-of-law principles and responds to sev-
eral concerns about using the antitrust laws to combat deception.
I. COMBATING DECEPTION
A. DECEPTION AND ITS HARMS
Deception means "[kJnowingly and willfully making a false statement
or representation, express or implied, pertaining to a present or past ex-
isting fact." 8 It includes knowingly withholding "facts basic to a transac-
tion."19 Deception does not occur in perfectly competitive markets,
which have transparent prices, highly elastic demand curves, easy entry
and exit, and perfectly-informed, profit-maximizing buyers and sellers
who are so numerous that each can act as a price-taker. Similarly, in the
perfectly competitive marketplace of ideas, truth quickly and costlessly
prevails through "the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources." 20 Consequently, deception requires
two important deviations from the competitive ideal: (1) falsity is not
quickly exposed in the marketplace of ideas, and (2) competition itself
cannot work effectively.21 Market participants do not act with full and
perfect knowledge (either buyers or sellers know less than their counter-
part) and enter suboptimal transactions (or forgo transactions alto-
Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) (discussing and collecting
criticisms of rule-of-reason standard) [hereinafter Stucke, Rule of Reason].
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 406 (6th ed. 1990).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
20. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (explaining that an essen-
tial goal of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is promoting a marketplace of
ideas by restricting governmental restraints on speech and achieving "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources").
21. See Robert H. Lande, Market Power Without a Large Market Share: The Role of
Imperfect Information and Other "Consumer Protection" Market Failures 2-5 (Am. Anti-
trust Inst. Working Paper No. 07-06, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
archives/wp07-06.ashx; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward A Better
Competition Policy for the Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies that Sup-
port the Media Sector's Unique Role in our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REv. 101, 105-29
(2009), and Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas,
69 ANTrrRUST L.J. 249, 256-88 (2001) (discussing the role of antitrust in preventing market
failure in the marketplace of ideas).
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gether).22 Deception's anticompetitive effects include the following:
* raising the search costs for consumers in choosing products;23
* leaving consumers who purchased the wrong or inferior product
worse off;24
* increasing the transaction costs for honest sellers to differentiate
their products and to reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with their desirable products;25
* raising rivals' costs (in having to respond to a competitor's decep-
tive statements);2 6
* creating market distortions and causing a deadweight welfare loss
as consumers forgo or minimize purchases;27
* tipping sales to the deceptive firm, which in markets with network
effects 2 8 can lead to the exercise of monopoly power;29
* increasing entry barriers for new products (whose qualities and
risks cannot be quickly assessed);30
* preventing some markets or services (such as standard setting) from
developing;3' and
* creating "lemon" markets where dishonest dealers for goods or ser-
22. See Lande, supra note 21, at 2.
23. Deception, for example, can cause consumers "to disregard valuable and truthful
information [such as the product's brand name] to rely on more expensive, time-consuming
product searches." Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real
Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1234 (1996); see, e.g.,
Gwendolyn Bounds, What Do Labels Really Tell You? As Eco-Seals Proliferate So Do
Doubts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, at Dl. This effect of deception was a concern when a
competitor palmed off its goods as that of its competitors. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160-66 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 2 cmt. a (1995) ("As confidence in the truth of advertising diminishes, prospective
purchasers may be forced to expend additional resources . . .
24. See Prentice, supra note 23, at 1234.
25. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164.
26. Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTrIRusT L.J. 311, 340 n.116 (2006); Prentice, supra note 23,
at 1242.
27. Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and the Flow of Consumer Information, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1055-56 (1991).
28. Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities": From Terminal Railroad
to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 560-61 (2009) ("The defining characteristic of network
industries is the increasing value of their products to users as the number of users in-
creases, a phenomenon called 'network effects' or demand-side economies of scale"; the
increased value can come directly (having more interconnections as a result of more users
(e.g., telephones)) or indirectly (having more supporting complements developed for that
product as the number of users increases (e.g., Windows operating system))); see also
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing the "posi-
tive network effect" of Windows); Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R.
11-3601 (discussing the indirect network effects of streaming media players).
29. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2007)
(discussing network effects for deception in standard-setting process).
30. Gerla, supra note 27, at 1068.
31. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTs: PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION 35 n.11 (Apr. 2007) [here-
inafter PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION] (discussing hold-up problem).
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vices drive out honest dealers, 32 thereby inhibiting innovation in
these markets.
Deception lacks any redeeming economic qualities or cognizable effi-
ciency justifications.33 Consequently, competition law and consumer pro-
tection policy reinforce each other: both empower consumers to exercise
the power of informed choice.34
Deception corrodes a market economy. In some markets, consumers
can easily discover and swiftly punish deception (such as a deceptive me-
teorologist claiming that it is sunny on a rainy day). But in many mar-
kets, it is time-consuming and costly to verify (if one could) every
material statement's trustworthiness independently. 35 As the financial
crisis shows, many markets operate on trust.36 With increasing specializa-
tion and dispersal of knowledge, society relies on human cooperation,
which depends in part on trust and on citizens' general adherence to cer-
32. FFC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) ("The honest manufac-
turer's business may suffer, not merely through a competitor's deceiving his direct cus-
tomer, the retailer, but also through the competitor's putting into the hands of the retailer
an unlawful instrument, which enables the retailer to increase his own sales of the dishon-
est goods, thereby lessening the market for the honest product."); George A. Akerlof, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488,
495 (1970) (nothing that the cost of dishonesty includes "loss incurred from driving legiti-
mate business out of existence").
33. Re: A Program Proposed by the American Medical Association & the Chicago
Medical Society Involving Peer Review of Physician Fees Is Not Likely To Violate Federal
Antitrust Laws, 117 F.T.C. 1091, 1097-98 (1994) ("Nothing in the antitrust laws prohibits
competitors from engaging in self-regulation to protect consumers from fraud, deception,
undue influence, and other abusive practices. Such regulation is likely to promote, rather
than impede, competition, by enabling consumer purchase decisions to be made free from
deceptive practices. Such practices distort the operation of a market economy, and their
elimination enhances competition and consumer welfare.") (citing Am. Med. Ass'n, 94
F.T.C. 701, 1009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 552 cmt. a ("[N]o
interest of society is served by promoting the flow of information not genuinely believed by
its maker to be true"); Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975,
977, 982-83 (2005) (cheap exclusion "unambiguously fails to enhance any party's effi-
ciency, provides no benefits (short or long-term) to consumers, and in its economic effect
produces only costs for the victims and wealth transfers to the firms engaging in the con-
duct"); ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE EcoNoMIcs OF WELFARE (Transaction Publishers 2002)
(1952) ("As a rule, however, the social net product of any dose of resources invested in a
deceptive activity is negative. Consequently, as with bargaining, no tax that yields a reve-
nue, though it may effect an improvement, can provide a complete remedy, and absolute
prohibition of the activity is required.").
34. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason
for Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv., 44, 47-49
(1998); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 713-14 (1997).
35. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities
Markets 12-13 (UCLA School of Law, Law of Econ Research Paper No. 09-15, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442023. For example, one cannot expect investors to verify inde-
pendently that the companies' financial statements are accurate, which, in turn, depends on
verifying the value of assets (including arcane investments such as CDOs which the compa-
nies may not fully comprehend) and liabilities. Id. at 4-5.
36. Stout, Trust Behavior, supra note 35, at 14; see Amartya Sen, Adam Smith's Market
Never Stood Alone, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at 11; see also Nava Ashraf et al., Adam
Smith, Behavioral Economist, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 136-37 (2005) (collecting some of
the literature on importance of trust in market economies).
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tain legal, social, and moral norms, such as truthfulness.37 If buyers, for
example, presume sellers are lying, commerce slows as buyers invest in
self-education (or otherwise insure against losses).38 Over the past
twenty years, the Internet and global commerce have increased and
broadened social relationships. To evolve, economies must rely increas-
ingly on complex, large-scale cooperation and interdependence among
citizens throughout the world. Many markets' health depends on the ex-
tent to which such legal, moral, and social norms of truthfulness are
internalized.
Rampant market fraud corrodes trust.39 The Secretary-General of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
placed the failure of business ethics at the recent financial crisis's epicen-
ter.40 Deception played an important role in the subprime lending cri-
sis.41 Trust in markets was further weakened as evidence of Ponzi
schemes and other financial deceptions emerged and the failure of gov-
ernment regulators to deter fraud became known.42 As the OECD Sec-
retary-General observed, the global financial crisis "was created by the
system itself; by the system which we created; and by a toxic combination
of unethical behavior by companies and a faulty regulation and supervi-
sion of their activities." 43
A free-market economy can withstand some deceit without seriously
damaging the necessary degree of trust.44 But markets may not be as
durable in withstanding (or exposing) deception as some laissez-faire the-
37. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE
73-75 (2005).
38. See sources cited supra note 23.
39. See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM FRAUDU.
LENT AND DECEPTIVE COMMERCIAL PRACTICES ACROSS BORDERS 9 (2003), http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/24/33/2956464.pdf (noting that fraudulent and deceptive commercial
practices can cause substantial harm to consumers, or pose an imminent threat of such
harm if not prevented by undermining consumer confidence in markets).
40. Angel Gurria, OECD Sec'y-Gen., Remarks at the European Bus. Ethics Forum in
Paris, Fr. (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649
201185_42033219 1_1_1_1,00.html. This loss of trust was reflected in the tenth edition of
the Edelman Trust Barometer, a survey of almost 4,500 "opinion leaders" across 20 coun-
tries. Sixty-two percent said they trusted companies less in 2009 than in 2008. In the
United States and Japan, more than 75% had lost faith in business in 2009. Only 38%
(down 20 percentage points from 2008 and the lowest since the poll began) said they
trusted business; only 36% trusted the banking sector (down from 68% in 2008).
EDELMAN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER: THE TENTH GLOBAL
OPINION LEADERS SURVEY 1 (10th ed. 2009), available at http://www.edelman.com/trust/
2009/docs/TrustBarometerExecutiveSummary.FINAL.pdf; Andrew Edgecliffe-John-
son, Davos Confronted by Peak of Distrust, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at 14.
41. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 3-4 (2004)
(noting problem of "outright fraud or deception-for example, falsifying documents or
intentionally misinforming borrowers about the terms of a loan.").
42. Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2010).
43. Gurria, supra note 40.
44. See sources cited supra note 36.
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orists suppose. Once fraud corrodes trust, free markets break down. As
the latter-day Cassandra in the Madoff fraud testified,
in the capital markets, you have to increase the risk of protection of
the frauds, and right now, in such high reward, low risk to commit
fraud, the markets feel green lighted because they have gotten away
with it for so long and until you have trust, the American investor
isn't coming back into our markets, and worse, foreign investors
won't either. 45
Besides its corrosive effect on trust, deceit is morally objectionable. 46
Deception is unfair to ethical companies that lose sales to a deceptive
competitor. It violates the moral norm of treating others as one would
like to be treated,47 and it is understood as the origin of evil.4 8 As F.A.
45. CNN Newsroom: Executive Compensation; Debating Stimulus; Madoff
Whistleblower Testifies on Capitol Hill-Part 1 (CNN television broadcast Feb. 4, 2009)
(comment of Harry Markopolos), available at 2009 WLNR 2287734 transcript.
46. The only justifiable instances are the extremes: an unimportant lie (told to be
tactful or polite) or a ticking time bomb scenario (e.g., terrorists ask you where the power
plant is-you deceive them).
47. See, e.g., C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 51-61 (MacMillan Co. 1947) (pro-
viding illustrations of Tao, which represents the sole source of all value judgments); see also
Ecclesiastes 37:3 (King James) ("0 wicked imagination, whence camest though in to cover
the earth with deceit?"); Exodus 20:16 (NIV) ("You shall not give false testimony against
your neighbor."); Mark 7:18-23 (NIV) ("'Are you so dull?' he asked. 'Don't you see that
nothing that enters a man from the outside can make him unclean? For it doesn't go into
his heart but into his stomach, and then out of his body.'. . . He went on: 'What comes out
of a man is what makes him unclean. For from within, out of men's hearts, come evil
thoughts, sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, greed, malice, deceit, lewdness, envy,
slander, arrogance and folly. All these evils come from inside and make a man "un-
clean."'); I Peter 2:1 (NIV) ("Therefore, rid yourselves of all malice and all deceit, hypoc-
risy, envy, and slander of every kind."); Proverbs 12:5 (NIV) ("The plans of the righteous
are just but the advice of the wicked is deceitful."); Psalm 119:29 (NIV) ("Keep me from
deceitful ways; be gracious to me through your law."); WORLD SCRIPTURE: A COMPARA-
TIVE ANTHOLOGY OF SACRED TEXTS pt.2, ch.9 (Dr. Andrew Wilson ed., Int'l Religious
Found. 1991) ("0 you who believe, wherefore do you say what you do not? Very hateful is
it to God, that you say what you do not." (quoting Qur'an 61.2-3)) (Islam); Hadith of
Muslim ("There are three characteristics of a hypocrite: when he speaks, he lies; when he
makes a promise, he acts treacherously; and when he is trusted, he betrays.") (Islam);
Dhammapada 176 ("There is no evil that cannot be done by the liar, who has transgressed
the one law of truthfulness and who is indifferent to the world beyond.") (Buddhism);
Laws of Manu 4.256 ("All things are determined by speech; speech is their root, and from
speech they proceed. Therefore he who is dishonest with respect to speech is dishonest in
everything.") (Hinduism)).
48. In the eighth circle of hell, for example, Dante recounted how the fraudsters were
punished. In this circle, the demon Malacoda lied to Dante and Virgil about a bridge they
could take. In hearing this deception, the Friar Catalano was nonplussed: "'Of the devil's
iniquities/ Once in Bologna I heard told, and heard/ That he is a liar and the father of
lies."' DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY: INFERNO (Laurence Binyon trans., Mac-
Millan 1943) reprinted in THE PORTABLE DANTE 125 (Paulo Milano ed., Viking Press
1947); see also WILLIAM BLAKE, A Poison Tree, in SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND OF EXPERI-
ENCE 89, 89 (Filiquarian Pub. 2007) (1794) ("I was angry with my friend:/ I told my wrath,
my wrath did end./ I was angry with my foe:/ I told it not, my wrath did grow./ And I
watered it in fears/ Night and morning with my tears/ And I sunned it with smiles/ And
with soft deceitful wiles/ And it grew both day and night./ Till it bore an apple bright/ And
my foe behold it shine,/ And he knew that it was mine,/ And into my garden stole/ When
the night had veiled the pole/ In the morning, glad, I see/ My foe outstretched beneath the
tree."); WORLD SCRIPTURE supra note 47 (quoting Maharatnakuta Sutra to say that: "A
[Vol. 631076
2010] How Do Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception? 1077
Hayek observed, totalitarian propaganda is destructive of all morals be-
cause it undermines "one of the foundations of all morals: the sense of
and the respect for truth."49
B. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL STATUTES To COMBAT DECEPTION
Because of the importance of trust in the global economy and the
harms from deceit, legal institutions play a key role in preventing and
punishing deception as well as encouraging more complex global trade
and exchange.50 Social sanctions may deter deception in personal deal-
ings but not always in the commercial marketplace. Profit-maximizers do
not always expose or punish fraudsters and reward truthful companies.
Thus, the marketplace of ideas is not always self-correcting and self-polic-
ing. As Professor Tamar Frankel testified on the Madoff Ponzi scheme,
"Investors will trust the institutions only if the law and other mechanisms
guarantee their trustworthiness, that is-that they will tell the truth and
abide by their promises."5 1
Accordingly, legal institutions and informal social and ethical norms
should promote ethical behavior; protect honest businesses and consum-
ers from deceit; and be "at the center of any new road-map for the global
economy." 52 Many market economies seek to deter and punish decep-
tion with criminal and civil penalties. In the United States, for example,
numerous federal laws (such as prohibitions on false statements;53 and
bank, 54 mail, 55 wire,56 and securities fraud57) and state laws (such as for-
gery;58 fraudulent use of a credit or debit card;59 and deceptive business
practiceS60) criminalize deception. 61 The FTC's mission, as Commis-
sioner Rosch discussed in the context of the financial meltdown, "is to
protect markets from anticompetitive, fraudulent, or deceptive conduct
liar lies to himself as well as to the gods. Lying is the origin of all evils; it leads to rebirth in
the miserable planes of existence, to breach of the pure precepts, and to corruption of the
body.") (quoting Maharatnakuta Sutra) (Bodhisattva suarata's Discourse).
49. F.A. HAYEK, The Road to Serfdom, in II THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK
172 (Bruce Caldwell ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007).
50. NORTH, supra note 37, at 74-75.
51. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Need for Regulatory Changes, Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 11th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2009) (testimony of Prof. Tamar Frankel), availa-
ble at 2009 WLNR 252887 (Westlaw).
52. Gurria, supra note 40.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
54. Id. §H 1005-06 (False Entries), 1914 (False Statements), 1344.
55. Id. § 1341.
56. Id. § 1343.
57. Id. § 1348.
58. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-114(a).
59. See, e.g., id. § 39-14-118.
60. See, e.g., id. § 39-14-127.
61. See 1A Louis ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 5:4 (4th ed. 2008); see also Mandatory Victims Res-
titution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006) (mandating restitution for victims of an
offense against property under title 18, including any offense committed by fraud or
deceit).
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that prevents those markets from functioning properly." 62
Given deception's moral and economic evils, its persistence, and its
myriad manifestations, the legal standards involving deceit continue to
evolve in the United States from their common law origins. This evolu-
tion is attributable in part to the difficulties in deterring deception under
the common law torts of fraud 63 and product disparagement. 64 Histori-
cally courts were inclined to apply the doctrine of caveat emptor (let the
buyer beware) and reserved liability to egregious instances of fraud.65
Consequently, common law fraud was, and remains, ineffective in deter-
ring false advertising of less expensive consumer goods.66 To make it eas-
ier for consumers67 (and in some states, competitors) to challenge
marketplace deception, many state legislatures in the 1960s and 1970s en-
acted Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices ("UDAP") statutes.68
Such state statutes seek "to secure an honest market place where trust,
and not deception, prevails." 69 Many UDAP statutes are modeled after
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 which itself arose as a
result of Congressional dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's rule-of-
reason standard for the Sherman Act.71 To prove a deceptive act under
Section 5, the FTC must show that (1) the "representation, omission, or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer," (2) consumers are inter-
62. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC, Speech at New York Bar Ass'n Annual Dinner:
Implications of the Financial Meltdown for the FTC (Jan. 29, 2009), http://ftc.gov/speeches/
rosch/090129financialcrisisnybarspeech.pdf.
63. The common law tort of fraud requires proof that (i) defendant "made a false
representation of a material fact" (or in certain cases an omission of a material fact); (ii)
with scienter (defendant's knowing that the statement is false or in reckless disregard of its
truth or falsity); (iii) intending to induce the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; (iv)
which the plaintiff actually relied in a "manner justifiable under the circumstances"; and
(v) plaintiff "suffered damages as a result of such reliance." DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M.
ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECflON AND THE LAw § 2.2, at 19 (2007).
64. A product disparagement claim requires that (i) defendant communicated or pub-
lished to a third-party a false statement disparaging plaintiff's property or title; (ii) with
scienter; (iii) intending or unreasonably risking harm to plaintiff's pecuniary interests (cal-
culated to prevent others from dealing with plaintiff) and (iv) plaintiff suffers special dam-
ages from defendant's actions. See Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 67 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir.
1995).
65. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 63, § 2.1.
66. Id.
67. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia limit the right to sue to consumers
with respect to their personal or household purchases. Id. § 4:2 n.1.
68. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act of 1977, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b)(8)
(2001) (prohibiting "disparaging the goods, services or business of another by false or mis-
leading representations of fact"); Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws,
Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 2(a)(8) (1966) (stating that Uniform Act
is "designed to bring state law up to date by removing undue restrictions on the common
law action for deceptive trade practices"), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 63, § 3:2.
69. Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
70. Lawrence R. Fullerton & Jane E. Larson, Using FTC Act Precedents in State Con-
sumer Protection Cases, 3 AN-rTRUST L.J. 24, 24 (1988).
71. Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FTC, Remarks at Section 5 Workshop: Tales from the
Crypt 2 (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/jleibowitz.pdf (dis-
cussing congressional response to the "rule of reason" analysis in the Standard Oil case).
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preting the message reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the mis-
leading effects are material, i.e., "likely to affect consumer's conduct or
decision." 7 2 Unlike common law fraud, the FTC (and private plaintiffs
under many state UDAPs) need not prove scienter73 or that consumers
were actually deceived.74 Besides making it easier to prosecute decep-
tion, many UDAP laws increase the private plaintiffs' economic incen-
tives to prosecute deception: private plaintiffs can recover their costs,
reasonable attorney's fees, and multiplied damages.7 5
Given the strong public policy to deter acts of unfair competition, Con-
gress also provided additional protections for competitors under the Lan-
ham Act. 7 6 A seller's deception, besides harming consumers, is also an
unfair method of competition. Deception diverts trade from honest com-
petitors.77 The marketplace of ideas, even in industries with marketing-
savvy competitors, does not always expose deception.7 8 To deter false or
misleading advertising, the Lanham Act (like the FTC Act and state
72. See FFC Policy Statement on Deception, appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc.,
103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 526 (stating that a misrepre-
sentation is fraudulent "if the maker (a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he
represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation
that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation
that he states or implies."); Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter, in MARTHA
STEWART'S LEGAL TROUBLES 225, 228-32 (Joan MacLeod Heminway ed., 2007) (discuss-
ing law and a cognitive perspective of scienter).
74. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 63, § 3:14. Private plaintiffs under a majority
of UDAP statutes need only show their actual reliance on the false statement (unlike the
common law where plaintiffs must prove that their reliance was justifiable). Id.
75. Id. at 571-73 (app. 6A). Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia provide
multiplied damages. Id. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia also provide for
statutory damages, which vary between $25 and $1000. Id. Hawaii and California award
additional damages if the victim is elderly. Id. All but six states award attorney's fees.
CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STAT-
UTES (Feb. 2009), http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/udaplcontent/UDAPReportFeb09.
pdf.
76. 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (2006); Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28,
31 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Under our economic system, competitors have the greatest interest in
stopping misleading advertising, and a private cause of action under section 43(a) allows
those parties with the greatest interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the
greatest resources to devote to a lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously."). Congress
amended the Lanham Act to clarify its application to misrepresentations about a competi-
tor's products. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988); see also S. REP. No. 100-515, 5603 (1988) ("Since its enactment in 1946 ... it has
been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal law of unfair competition . .. . In
one important area, however, the courts have refused to apply the section. Based on a
1969 seventh circuit decision, the courts have held that Section 43(a) applies only to mis-
representations about one's own products or services; it does not extend to misrepresenta-
tions about competitor's products or services. The committee agrees that this effect is
illogical on both practical and public policy levels and that the public policy of deterring
acts of unfair competition will be served if Section 43(a) is amended to make clear that
misrepresentations about another's products are as actionable as misrepresentations about
one's own.") (citations omitted).
77. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493 (1922).
78. Coca-Cola, 822 F.2d at 31 (rejecting the claim that "the advertising industry is a
self-policing industry that considers claims of misrepresentations of quality").
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UDAP laws) makes it easier to punish such advertising. Plaintiffs need
not prove scienter or that consumers justifiably relied on a misrepresenta-
tion.79 Congress also increased an injured plaintiff's incentives to chal-
lenge a competitor's deceit. A plaintiff, in the district court's discretion,
can receive up to three times the amount of the plaintiff's actual dam-
ages.80 Thus, the "trial court's primary function is to make violations of
the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party."81 As a conse-
quence, competitors have recovered under the Lanham Act for a variety
of deceptive commercial practices, including palming off, false advertis-
ing, commercial defamation, and misappropriation. 82
II. DECEIT UNDER THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS
As Part I discussed, deception lacks any redeeming ethical, moral, or
economic justifications, and at times leads to anticompetitive outcomes.
Given the importance of trust in the marketplace, the United States de-
ploys various legal weapons to deter and punish deception.83 It logically
follows that the U.S. competition laws, which most directly delineate be-
tween fair and unfair competitive behavior, also would take a hard line
against deception, when anticompetitive. As this Part discusses, the legis-
lative aim of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is to deter acts of unfair com-
petition, which historically included a competitor's deception. This
legislative aim furthers the general public policy to deter and punish
deception.
A. SHERMAN Acr's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A good starting point is to examine the purpose of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits any person from "monopoliz[ing], or at-
tempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspir[ing] with any other
79. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUsT LAw, BUSINESS TORTS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
HANDBOOK 64-65 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ABA HANDBOOK]; ALTMAN & POLLACK,
supra note 61, § 5.5. Courts distinguish between actual false statements and statements
that, while literally true, may be considered misleading. Johnson & Johnson Merck Con-
sumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1992). Where
its "theory of recovery is premised upon a claim of implied falsehood, [the] plaintiff must
demonstrate, by extrinsic evidence, that the challenged commercials tend to mislead or
confuse consumers." Id. However, if plaintiff
adequately demonstrates that [the] defendant . . . intentionally set out to
deceive the public,' and the defendant's 'deliberate conduct' in this regard is
of an 'egregious nature,' a presumption arises 'that consumers were, in fact,
deceived.... In such a case, once a plaintiff establishes deceptive intent,' the
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the absence of consumer
confusion.
Id. at 298-99.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). Subject to the principles of equity, the Lanham Act
also allows the successful litigant "to recover defendant's profits, any damages sustained by
the plaintiff, and the costs of the action," and "in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party." Id.
81. Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985).
82. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 79, at 65.
83. See supra Part I.
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person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce"
among the several States, or with foreign nations.84
Senator Kenna's hypothetical, which concerned a citizen who obtained
a monopoly in shorthorn cattle by virtue of his superior skill, generated
the most extensive legislative debate on Section 2.85 The other Senators
agreed that the monopolist did not violate the Sherman Act.86 Seeking to
preserve economic opportunity,87 the Sherman Act does not criminalize
bigness. It is not intended to target, as Judge Learned Hand later charac-
terized, the "single producer [who] may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry." 8
Instead, as the legislative history shows, Section 2 reaches "means
which prevent other men from engaging in fair competition with him,"
and which include "engrossing, the buying up of all other persons en-
gaged in the same business." 89 Section 2 thus targets monopolistic prac-
tices that make "it impossible for other persons to engage in fair
competition." 90 The widespread belief was "that the great trusts had ac-
quired their power, in the main, through destroying or overreaching their
weaker rivals by resort[ing] to unfair practices." 91
Consequently Section 2's purpose is to combat unfair methods of com-
petition, which historically included a competitor's deception. Congress
focused not on the end-monopoly-but the means of attaining (or
maintaining) that end. Were the means normatively fair (by virtue of the
monopolist's superior skill in that particular product) or unfair (actions
making it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, such
as engrossing-acquiring-all other persons engaged in the same
business)?
Congress did not expect the courts to define de novo what unfair meth-
ods of competition fell under the term "monopolize," and thereby force
the parties and lower courts to "ramble through the wilds of economic
theory."92 Instead the courts were expected to use the existing common
law as guidance. 93 As Senator Hoar noted, "the word 'monopoly' is a
84. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
85. 21 CONG. REc. 1351, 3151-52 (1890).
86. Id.
87. The Sherman Act, at its broadest level, seeks to preserve a person's right to freely
trade and "to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against evils com-
monly incident to destruction of competition through monopolies and combinations in re-
straint of trade." Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 42 (1930)
(quoting Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923)).
88. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
89. 21 CONG. REc. 3151, 1352 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
90. Id.
91. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 434 (1920) (citing William S. Stevens, Unfair Competi-
tion, POL. Sci. Q. 283 (1914); H. B. REED, THE MORALS OF MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION
(1916)).
92. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
93. WILLIAM H. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST Acr AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1913) (stating that the Sherman Act was drafted by "great lawyers
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merely technical term that has a clear and legal signification," namely
"the use of means which made it impossible for other persons to engage
in fair competition."9 4 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, continued Senator
Hoar, sought "to extend the common-law principles, which protected fair
competition in trade in old times in England, to international and inter-
state commerce in the United States." 95
The Supreme Court agreed. The prevailing common law on unfair
trade practices was to provide some certainty for determining anticompe-
titive practices under the Sherman Act. 9 6
"Unfair competition" in the common law when the Sherman Act was
enacted (and which the Sherman Act sought to incorporate) was
grounded in preventing injury to a rival competitor by misrepresenta-
tion.97 Unfair competition involved not only passing off one's goods as
those of another but "all cases where fraud is practiced by one in securing
the trade of a rival dealer."98 Besides protecting the purchasing public,
who may be presumed to have used those expressions with the intention that they should
be interpreted in the light of common law").
94. 21 CONG. REC. 1351, 3152 (1890).
95. Id.
96. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) ("[T]he standard of reason
which had been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of
the character embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used for the purpose
of determining whether, in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute provided."); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (stating that Sherman Act prohibitions included undue restraints of
trade under the common law); Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in
Antitrust, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 207, 207-09 (2003) ("Antitrust began [as] the common law
tort of restraint of trade."). Whether the common law provided this certainty was itself
questioned. Herbert Pope, The Reason for the Continued Uncertainty of the Sherman Act,
7 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 201-02 (1912).
97. Charles Grove Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE L.J. 1, 6
(1919); Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 32 (1953); see
also Klingel's Pharmacy of Baltimore City v. Sharp & Dohme, 64 A. 1029, 1030 (Md. 1906)
("[A~n action will lie for a combination or conspiracy by fraudulent and malicious acts to
drive a trader out of business, resulting in damage.") (citing Van Horn v. Van Horn, 20 A.
485, 486 (1890)); Messerole v. Tynberg, 36 How. Pr. 14 (N.Y.C.P. Special Term 1868) ("The
market is closed against no one who, in a fair and honest spirit of rivalry, seeks to monopo-
lize the entire trade in one or more articles of merchandise, but the elements of fraud,
deceit, or malappropriation of another's rights can receive no countenance from courts of
equitable jurisdiction.").
98. Nat'l Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 205 (9th Cir. 1955); California Fig-Syrup Co.
v. Frederick Stearns & Co., 73 F. 812, 817 (6th Cir. 1896) ("It is well settled that if a person
wishes his trade mark property to be protected by a court of equity he must come into
court with clean hands, and if it appears that the trade mark for which he seeks protection
is itself a misrepresentation to the public, and has acquired a value with the public by
fraudulent misrepresentation in advertisements, all relief will be denied to him."); Apol-
linaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) ("All practices between rivals in busi-
ness which tend to engender unfair competition are odious and will be suppressed by
injunction. . . . [Mlerchant or trader is entitled to protection only against dishonest or
perfidious rivalry in business. He will be protected against the fraudulent or deceitful sim-
ulations by a competitor of tokens which tend to confuse the identity or business of the one
with the other, and against the false representation of facts which tend to mislead the
public and divert custom from the one to the other."); see BFI Group Divino Corp. v. JSC
Russian Aluminum, 481 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Colson Corp. v. Pierce Mfg.
Corp., 37 F. Supp. 900, 901 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
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the common law sought to protect honest businesses from dishonest and
fraudulent practices and "to promote honesty and fair dealing." 99
Consequently, in Nash v. United States, the Court had little difficulty
dispensing with the indicted defendants' argument that the Sherman Act
was unconstitutionally vague. 100 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes (a
skeptic of the Sherman Act 01) noted that the restraints at issue, which
included the defendants' fraudulent and deceptive practices, were com-
monly understood under the common law to be unreasonable
practices. 102
The Federal Trade Commission Act, for example, specifically pros-
cribes "unfair methods of competition,"10 3 as well as "unfair and decep-
tive acts or practices."'0 In the context of discussing the FTC's
unfairness jurisdiction in consumer protection, FTC Commissioner
Douglass said "unfairness is the set of general principles of which decep-
tion is a particularly well-established and streamlined subset." 05
III. MODERN TRENDS IN DETERRING DECEPTION UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACT
A Section 2 monopolization claim requires today "(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent."10 6 Many courts had little difficulty in condemning a monopolist's
anticompetitive deception as "willful" conduct.' 07 Other courts, how-
ever, have erected hurdles for antitrust plaintiffs injured by a monopo-
list's deception.108 Such hurdles, as this Part discusses, are contrary to
Section 2's legislative aim, the common law antecedents of the Sherman
Act, other congressional policies, and the legal maxim deceptis non
decipientibus, jura subveniunt (the law helps "persons who are deceived,
99. Haines, supra note 97, at 9-10.
100. 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913).
101. Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice Holmes, 18 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 283, 312-13 (1994).
102. Nash, 299 U.S. at 377-78. The defendants allegedly conspired to restrain com-
merce by, among other things: (1) "bidding down turpentine and rosin so that competitors
could sell them only at ruinous prices;" (2) "circulating false statements as to naval stores
production and stocks on hand;" (3) "issuing fraudulent warehouse receipts;" (4) "fraudu-
lently grading, regrading, and raising grades of rosins, and falsely gauging spirits of turpen-
tine;" and (5) "attempting to bribe employees of competitors so as to obtain information
concerning their business and stocks." Id. at 375.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
104. Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (amending Section 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45, to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" and adding Section 12 of the FTC
Act to prohibit false advertising of "food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics") (emphasis added).
105. Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
106. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
107. See infra note 125.
108. See infra Part III.A.
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not those deceiving"). 109 This Part examines the courts' varying legal
standards for evaluating a monopolist's deception involving: (1) advertis-
ing and product disparagement, (2) vaporware, (3) standard-setting orga-
nizations, and (4) other contexts.
A. FALSE ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
Nearly every court recognizes that a monopolist's deceptive advertising
and product disparagement under certain factual circumstances can vio-
late the U.S. antitrust laws." 0 Professors Areeda, Turner, and later
Hovenkamp in their Antitrust Law treatise (the Treatise) take a more
restrictive view of deception by a monopolist as a Sherman Act viola-
tion.111 Even the Treatise recognizes, however, that the antitrust laws ex-
tend to deception."x2 The U.S. Courts of Appeal in the Second, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits rely upon the Treatise and presume that the competi-
tive harm from deception is generally de minimis, but other circuits do
not make such a presumption. The difference, then, among the courts is
the legal standard for evaluating deceit by a monopolist under the anti-
trust laws.
Because the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, besides citing the Trea-
tise, offer little, if any, independent analysis for their presumptions and
elements," 3 this section focuses primarily on the Treatise. The three cir-
cuits have never examined critically, as this Article does, the Treatise's
presumption. Those circuits have never inquired whether the presump-
tion against competitive harm, and the six elements offered by the Trea-
tise to overcome the presumption, can be reconciled with the Sherman
Act's legislative aim.
In fact, the Treatise's legal presumption came into antitrust jurispru-
dence largely via the Second Circuit's dictum in one footnote.114 In Ber-
109. JOHN TRAYNER, LATIN PHRASES AND MAXIMS: COLLECTED FROM THE INSTITU-
TIONAL AND OTHER WRITERS ON SCOTCH LAw 73 (1861).
110. See infra note 125. As one district court recently noted, "One approach, followed
by the Seventh Circuit, is that false and defamatory statements never constitute a violation
of the antitrust laws." W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, No. 09-CV-0480,
2009 WL 3601600, at *35 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2009) (citing Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l. Co.,
415 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.)) (citation omitted). Judge Easter-
brook's assumption of a self-correcting and self-policing marketplace of ideas, however, is
sui generis.
111. IIIB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALY-
SIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 782b, at 326-31 (3d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter TREATISE].
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of
Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. Prof'1 Testing Serv., Inc.
v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'I Publ'ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (9th Cir.
1997); Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1988).
114. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288 n.41 (2d Cir. 1979). A
few days before Berkey, a district court also, without much analysis, relied on the Treatise's
presumption and elements. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 180-81
(D. Del. 1979). The court simply said such deception, "even if taken in concert, must be
subject to a de minimis rule, if the antitrust courts are not to become the battleground for a
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key Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Kodak indicated on its Kodacolor
II film boxes that its film had a fourteen-month shelf life, when the film
actually "lost half its speed within three to six months."115 The Second
Circuit said it "need not decide whether this . . . amounted to deceptive
advertising or whether and under what circumstances such deception
might violate" Section 2.116 The court added, in dicta, that "[t]he Sher-
man Act is not a panacea for all evils that may infect business life."117
And if the court were to decide the issue, it would follow the Treatise and
require the antitrust plaintiff to overcome a presumption that such prac-
tice had a de minimis effect on competition.118
Nearly a decade later, the Second Circuit in Ayerst cited the dictum and
adopted, without analysis, Areeda and Turner's six elements.119 The
Ninth Circuit, thereafter, simply cited Ayerst and the Treatise, without
offering any independent rationale.120 The Sixth Circuit likewise fol-
lowed the Ninth and Second Circuits' adoption of the presumption, but
formally required only two of the six elements.121 The Second and Ninth
Circuits' earlier legal analysis was so deficient that the Sixth Circuit found
it "unclear whether [the Second Circuit] thought each requirement was
mandatory."122 Thus, the Sixth Circuit stated that all six elements were
relevant, but declined, given the facts before the lower court on summary
judgment, to consider each element or hold that an antitrust plaintiff
must satisfy all six elements to rebut its newly-adopted de minimis pre-
sumption.123 Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, to survive summary judgment, an
antitrust "plaintiff must show a genuine issue of material fact regarding at
least two elements . . . (1) the advertising was clearly false, and (2) it
would be difficult or costly for the plaintiff to counter the false
advertising."124
Given this uncritical reliance on the Treatise, the basis for the three
circuits' legal presumption and rebuttal elements is infirm if the Treatise's
reasoning is infirm. Monopolists will continue to urge upon other courts
outside these three circuits that they similarly adopt the Treatise's pre-
sumption and elements. Some courts will be tempted to follow the lead
variety of intentional-tort suits." Id. at 180. Subsequent courts have not cited Pezetel as
their basis for adopting the Treatise.




119. Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988).
120. Am. Prof'1 Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'1 Publn's,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003).
121. Am. Council of Certified Pediatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 371 n.6.
123. Id. at 371.
124. Id. While recognizing that false advertising cannot benefit competition, the Sixth
Circuit felt that false advertising could not harm competition "unless it was so difficult for
the plaintiff to counter." Id. at 371-72.
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of the three circuits, especially when there is no alternative legal standard
dealing specifically with a monopolist's deceit.
1. The Deficiencies of the Three Circuits' Legal Presumption of De
Minimis Harm
Some courts recognize deceptive advertising and disparagement of a
competitor's product as generally indefensible and readily condemn a
monopolist's anticompetitive deceit.125 Although these courts do not cite
a legal standard specifically addressing a monopolist's deceit, their results
are generally consistent with Section 2's legislative aim and the overall
trend of taking a harder line against deceptive advertising and promo-
tions in the marketplace. But the courts in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits following the Treatise are reluctant to use the Sherman Act to
punish such deception. They simply assume, like the Treatise, that a mo-
nopolist's deceptive advertising and product disparagement have a de
minimis impact on competition.126 In several cases, district courts outside
these three circuits cite the factors.1 27
125. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2000);
Int'l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1257-58, 1278 (8th Cir.
1980) (upholding Sherman Act violation for deceptive marketing campaign to prevent
travel group charters from becoming a competitive threat); Caldon, Inc. v. Advanced Mea-
surement & Analysis Grp., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 565, 580 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (denying motion
to dismiss plaintiff's claims that defendant attained monopoly through deception); W. Du-
plicating, Inc. v. Riso Kagaku Corp., No. Civ. S98-208 FCD GGH, 2000 WL 1780288, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2000) (finding monopolist's fear, uncertainty, doubt (FUD) marketing
campaign to discourage customers from buying competitor's ink and masters was actiona-
ble under Sherman Act); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274,
285 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying summary judgment on allegations of FUD and vaporware
campaign); Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 89-2839-CIV-NESBIT, 1994 WL 912242, at
*2, *7, *15 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (denying summary judgment on allegations of deception to
maintain monopoly); Brownlee v. Applied Biosystems, Inc., No. C-88-20672-RPA, 1989
WL 53864, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1989) (denying motion to dismiss complaint alleging
defendants' deceit to potential customers and other third parties along with other anticom-
petitive conduct); Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater Co., 356 F. Supp. 872, 897
(E.D. Pa. 1973); see also Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (finding that falsely disparaging
competitive supplies were among Xerox's anticompetitive practices to maintain its monop-
oly illegally).
126. Am. Council, 323 F.3d at 370; Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Legal & Prof'1 Publn's, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat'l Ass'n of
Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2nd Cir. 1988); TYR Sport Inc. v. Warnaco
Swimwear Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Alternative Electrodes, LLC
v. EMPI, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google,
Inc., No. C-06-2057-JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Applera
Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 (D. Conn. 2004); Tate v. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079-80 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Acco
Brands, Inc., No. CV99-1877DT(MCX), 2000 WL 986995, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000);
Multivideo Labs, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 99 CIV. 3908(DLC), 2000 WL 12122, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2000).
127. L-3 Commc'ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 07-CV-0341-B,
2008 WL 4391020, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008); Walgreen Co. v. Astrazeneca Pharm.
L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2008); Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 530-32 (E.D. Tex. 2004); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 1130,1158 (D. Kan. 2000); David L. Aldridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp.
728, 749 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Leavitt, 865 F. Supp. 951, 963 (D. Mass. 1994);
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 180-81 (D. Del. 1979).
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The Treatise's legal presumption of de minimis harm from deception
makes little sense (other than to deter injured victims from challenging a
monopolist's deceit under the Sherman Act). First, legal presumptions
that do not rest on "actual market realities are generally disfavored in
antitrust law." 128 Accordingly, courts first should examine whether the
Treatise provides empirical support for its presumption that monopolies'
deceptive practices generally have a de minimis impact on competition.
The Treatise does not offer any empirical basis. The Treatise only states
that while not a justification for "isolated" examples of falsehood,
"[m]any buyers ... recognize disparagement as nonobjective and highly
biased." 129 Consequently, according to the Treatise, deception employed
by a monopolist in disparaging a smaller competitor's products "should
presumably be ignored." 30
Second, besides lacking empirical support, the Treatise's assertion does
not make economic sense. If product disparagement is ineffectual, why
would any firm, much less a monopolist, engage in it? A rational profit-
maximizing monopolist recognizes that deceit has costs, including the
costs for the deceptive advertising and promotional campaign and the po-
tential loss of sales, goodwill, and competitive advantage if the deceit is
discovered. A monopolist would not falsely disparage a rival's products
unless its anticipated gains (maintaining or attaining profits) outweigh its
costs. A profit-maximizer would not casually incur advertising costs to
falsely disparage a rival's products and expose itself to criminal and civil
liability if buyers, as the Treatise claims, dismiss such ads as "nonobjective
and highly biased."' 3 ' Accordingly, the Lanham Act recognizes that a
competitor can profit in falsely disparaging a rival's product.132 Indeed, a
plaintiff, under certain conditions, can recover a defendant's profits in
addition to any damages the plaintiff sustained. 33
Third, the Treatise's presumption is inconsistent with the Sherman
Act's legislative aim to proscribe unfair methods of competition, which
historically included a competitor's anticompetitive deception. By defini-
tion, maintaining a monopoly through "false, misleading and deceptive
advertising" is unfair competition.134 The Treatise recognizes that decep-
tion lacks any redeeming virtue, but points to the social costs in litigating
it.135 The evidence, however, suggests that despite the extensive federal
128. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992).
129. TREATISE, supra note 111, 782d, at 332.
130. Id. But see id. at 333 (recognizing a possible exception where the monopolist, be-
cause of its market position contracts, to test or evaluate a rival's product).
131. Id. at 332.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
133. Id. § 1117(a); see also Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293,
1322 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (citing factors as to when to award a defendant's profits to the
plaintiff).
134. Int'l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1268 (8th Cir. 1980).
135. TREATISE, supra note 111, 782b, at 326.
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and state legislation, fraud is under litigated rather than over litigated. 136
In defense of the presumption, the Ninth Circuit quoted an earlier edi-
tion of the Treatise, which stated that the tort of product disparagement
was difficult to prove at common law and, thus, generally disfavored. 137
This argument ignores the tort's origin. Its requirement of special dam-
ages arose-not from any judicial distrust of product disparagement-but
"as a result of the friction between the ecclesiastical and common law
courts of England when the common law courts sought to assume juris-
diction over actions for defamation."13 8 Because "slander of any kind
was a sin, church courts alone could punish unless temporal damage
could be shown to have resulted from the defamatory words."1 39 Moreo-
ver, this argument does not account for the later legislative policies, such
as the Lanham Act and state UDAP laws, which make prosecuting decep-
tive conduct easier and increase private plaintiffs' economic incentives to
bring product disparagement cases.
Fourth, the Treatise's presumption is inconsistent with other U.S. con-
gressional directives regarding false advertising claims. Both the Sherman
and Lanham Acts address unfair competition. Under the Lanham Act,
courts "routinely presume that literally false [comparative] advertising
actually deceives consumers."1 40 But when evaluating the same false ad-
136. The FTC, for example, found that 13.5% of adults in the U.S. (30.2 million con-
sumers) were the victim of one of sixteen types of fraud included in its 2005 survey. FTC,
CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SECOND FTC SURVEY 55 (2007).
137. Am. Prof'I Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ'ns,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Even at common law, this is 'a tort that never
has been greatly favored."' (quoting III PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAw 737b, at 280-81 (1978))). This language does not appear in the Treatise's
third edition. TREATISE, supra note 111, 782d, at 332.
138. Testing Sys., Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1966). As
the court noted:
Until the 19th Century the requirement did not impose any untoward bur-
den on the litigant. The early business community was devoid of the com-
plexities that characterize the modern market place, and it was the rule,
rather than the exception, that tradesmen knew their customers well. It was
not too difficult, therefore, to determine just when and why one's customers
began to favor a competitor. As is so often the case, however, the rule re-




140. Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1320-21 (N.D. Ga.
2008). "[A] growing number of courts have also adopted a presumption, in cases where
money damages are sought, that willfully deceptive, comparative advertisements cause fi-
nancial injury to the party whose product the advertisement targets." Id.; see also Johnson
& Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002)
(noting that if advertisement is literally false, movant need not present evidence of con-
sumer deception); Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302,
314-15 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[Alpplying a presumption of consumer deception to all literal
falsity claims, irrespective of the type of relief sought, makes sense. . . Common sense and
practical experience tell us that we can presume, without reservation, that consumers have
been deceived when a defendant has explicitly misrepresented a fact that relates to an
inherent quality or characteristic of the article sold."); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp.,
110 F.3d 1329, 1336 (8th Cir. 1997) ("A predicate finding of intentional deception, as a
major part of the defendant's marketing efforts, contained in comparative advertising, en-
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vertising under the Sherman Act, a court, in applying the Treatise's pre-
sumption, would presume the contrary: namely, the same buyers
recognize the disparagement as nonobjective and highly biased and thus
are not misled.141
Cases exist where a company salesperson at a trade show casually dis-
parages a competitor's products.142 The Treatise is justified in consider-
ing such isolated comments as presumptively harmless. But courts
typically dismiss such claims anyway.143 Puffery is not actionable under
the common law,14 4 the FTC Act,145 the state UDAP laws,146 or the Lan-
ham Act.147 Moreover, as the Treatise recognizes, deceptive statements
are not per se illegal under the Sherman Act.148 Antitrust plaintiffs must
prove the other Section 2 elements, including causation, antitrust injury,
and damages.149
2. Critique of the Courts' Six Elements
To rebut its empirically unsupported presumption that deceptive adver-
tising and product disparagement have a de minimis effect on competi-
compasses sufficient harm to justify a rebuttable presumption of causation and injury in
fact."); HipSaver Co. v. J.T. Posey Co., 497 F. Supp. 2d 96, 106 (D. Mass. 2007) (recogniz-
ing a "rebuttable presumption of causation and injury for willful literally false [compara-
tive] advertising in a two firm market"); lams Co. v. Nutro Prod., No. 3:00-CV-566, 2004
WL 5779999, slip op. at *5 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2004) (finding that statements' literal falsity
give rise to "a presumption of actual deception" and "[i]n instances of comparative adver-
tising, where the competitor's products are specifically targeted, a plaintiff is also entitled
to a presumption of money damages"); Heidi Ott A.G. v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d
1055, 1072 (D. Minn. 2001) (noting that a presumption of causation and injury applied
when "defendant deliberately engaged in deceptive comparative advertising").
141. TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 782d, at 332.
142. E.g., Gilson v. Rainin Instrument, LLC, No. 04-C-852-S, 2005 WL 955251, at *9
(W.D. Wis. Apr. 25, 2005); Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Tennant Co., Inc., No. 96C1481, 1997
WL 543097, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1997).
143. E.g., Gilson, 2005 WL 955251, at *10; Breuer, 1997 WL 543097, at *9.
144. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 649.
A competitor is conditionally privileged to make an unduly favorable com-
parison of the quality of his own land, chattels or other things, with the qual-
ity of the competing land, chattels or other things of a rival competitor,
although he does not believe that his own things are superior to those of the
rival competitor, if the comparison does not contain false assertions of spe-
cific unfavorable facts regarding the rival competitor's things.
Id.
145. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8351 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 300) (explaining that puffing is "expressions that the consumer clearly under-
stands to be pure sales rhetoric on which he should not rely in deciding whether to
purchase the seller's product").
146. See, e.g., Evanston Hosp. v. Crane, 627 N.E.2d 29, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding
that hospital's "representations in its publications as to the care it would extend to patients
were mere expressions of opinion or 'puffing'. . . . they are not actionable under the Con-
sumer Fraud Act").
147. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the challenged statement was puffery, which cannot support a Lanham Act
claim).
148. TREATISE, supra note 111, 782b, at 327.
149. Am. Prof'l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof'l Publ'ns,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
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tion, the Treatise requires an antitrust plaintiff to offer cumulative proof
as to six elements: "the representations were (1) clearly false, (2) clearly
material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to buy-
ers without knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged
periods, and (6) not readily susceptible of neutralization or other offset
by rivals."o50 Again, neither the Treatise nor the courts adopting these six
elements explain (1) how they arrived at these elements, (2) the empirical
support for these elements, or (3) how these elements further the Sher-
man Act's legislative aim, make any economic sense, or can be reconciled
with the common and statutory law on deception.151 The six elements go
beyond what is required for a Section 5 claim under the FTC Act, the
state UDAP laws, the Lanham Act, the common law on unfair competi-
tion, and even common law fraud. Further, the six elements do not sig-
nificantly reduce the risk of false positives. 152 Rather, in deterring
victims from challenging a monopolist's anticompetitive deceit under the
Sherman Act, the six elements significantly increase the risk of false
negatives, are inconsistent with Section 2's legislative aim, and make no
economic sense.
As to the first three elements, it would be defensible if the Treatise
required that the deception be "clearly" anticompetitive to violate Sec-
tion 2. But it makes no sense to require a monopolist's deception to be
"clearly" false, "clearly" material, and "clearly" likely to induce reasona-
ble reliance under the Sherman Act. No such requirement exists under
the FTC Act,153 the Lanham Act,154 the UDAP statutes,155 the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 156 or common law
fraud. 57 It is hard to fathom why the risk of false positives for claims of
deception is greater under the antitrust laws than under these other
causes of action, especially when a plaintiff in a civil RICO action, or
under some state UDAP statutes, may recover treble damages and attor-
150. Id. (citing factors); TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 782b, at 327. The Sixth Circuit
said that all six factors are relevant but to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show
a genuine issue of material fact that "(1) the advertising was clearly false, and (2) it would
be difficult or costly for the plaintiff to counter the false advertising." Am. Council of
Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d
366, 371 (6th Cir. 2003).
151. Am. Council, 323 F.3d at 370; Harcourt Brace, 108 F.3d at 1151-52; Nat'l Ass'n of
Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayers Labs, 850 F.2d 904, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1988); TREATISE, supra note 111,
782b, at 327-28.
152. False positives here involve finding antitrust liability for restraints that are com-
petitively neutral or procompetitive. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004). "Mistaken inferences and the resulting false
condemnations 'are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect." Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
154. See id. § 1125(a).
155. See, e.g., 875 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 2008).
156. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SecoNo) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 649.
[Vol. 631090
2010] How Do Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception? 1091
neys' fees (or punitive damages under the common law).15 8 Courts deal
with claims of deception in many different contexts. Given the judiciary's
long experience evaluating claims of deception, one would expect that the
risk of false positives is lower for deception claims under the Sherman
Act than for other less familiar economic behavior, such as tying or bun-
dled rebates. Courts are comfortable sending a local shopkeeper to jail
for deception or awarding treble RICO damages for fraudulent activity.
It makes no sense to impose the requirement "clearly" on these common
law elements when a monopolist engages in similar deceit. 159
The Treatise's fourth element-requiring buyers to be "without knowl-
edge of the subject matter"160-motivates buyers either to remain igno-
rant of the subject matter or to increase their search costs by verifying the
veracity of the monopolist's statement. A victim's general knowledge of
the subject matter should not absolve a monopolist of its deception. Ac-
cordingly, both common law fraud and the later federal and state statutes
do not impose the Treatise's element. They focus on the actor's decep-
tion, rather than the victim's capacity to thwart the deception. Under the
common law, for example, market participants can "assume that a repre-
sentation of fact material in affecting his decision to engage or not to
engage in the particular transaction is honestly made" unless its falsity is
158. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1946(c) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (West
1999 & Supp. 2010).
159. Perhaps this element refers to state jurisdictions where a plaintiff must prove the
elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, a higher standard than a preponder-
ance of the evidence. But this only requires that sufficient evidence exists to make that fact
highly probable, which differs from requiring the statement to be "clearly" false or mate-
rial. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 493 (2010). A Westlaw search did not identify any
state or federal judicial decision that used the Treatise's "clearly" false and misleading
elements interchangeably with the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. Even if
the Treatise's clearly false and material elements were similar to some states' clear and
convincing evidentiary standard, the lower preponderance of evidence standard governs
federal civil antitrust claims. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d
214, 227 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting courts' "presumption that the preponderance standard
applies even in civil cases that involve fraud"). Moreover, Congress has chosen the pre-
ponderance standard in creating various substantive causes of action for fraud, including
the Lanham Act. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1991) (citing 31 U.S.C.
§ 3731(c) (1988) (False Claims Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(e) (1988 & Supp. 1989) (civil penal-
ties for fraud involving financial institutions); 42 C.F.R. § 1003.114(a) (1989) (Medicare
and Medicaid fraud under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1988)); Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-90 (1983) (civil enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96 (1981) (administrative proceedings con-
cerning violation of antifraud provisions of the securities laws); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); First Nat'l Monetary
Corp. v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1987) (civil fraud provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act); cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985)
(suggesting that the preponderance standard applies to civil RICO actions); see also World
Wide Ass'n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2006) (false
advertising claims under Lanham Act); In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117
(F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (finding that the clear and convincing standard does not apply to the
elements of antitrust case because it happens to involve a patent and "[nlo court has held
that clear and convincing evidence is required to establish Section 5 deception"); 21 C.J.S.
Credit Reporting Agencies § 112 (2008) ("[p]roof by a preponderance of the evidence gen-
erally is sufficient" for consumer protection statutes).
160. TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 782b, at 327.
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obvious to one's senses or one is aware of specific facts that makes reli-
ance unjustifiable. 161 Even when victims could investigate "without any
considerable trouble or expense," 162 the common law does not impose a
duty to investigate. 163
One district court noted the paradox164 If sophisticated buyers have
general knowledge about the subject matter, they arguably would dis-
count (and possibly punish) any deception.165 Knowing that the buyer
has such knowledge, a rational monopolist would not deceive them.166
One then can draw several conclusions: (1) the monopolist cannot differ-
entiate between sophisticated and unsophisticated purchasers, (2) the
monopolist predicted poorly its ability to deceive the victim, or (3) even
sophisticated purchasers at times are overconfident and can be duped. 167
If the monopolist predicted poorly, then the monopolist-while morally
culpable-did not violate Section 2, as causation is missing. Otherwise,
the monopolist may be liable.
Fraud victims include corporations.16 8 As Professor Robert Prentice
found, "there is substantial empirical evidence that people are unable to
detect when they are being deceived, but, worse still, inaccurately believe
that they can do so."169 Monopolists may exploit such shortcomings in
the buyers' knowledge or reasoning.170 In Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco
Co., for example, the moist snuff monopoly was the category manager for
moist snuff for many retailers.171 Plaintiff alleged, and the fact finder
found, that the monopolist abused its position as category manager by
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 541A cmt. a.
162. Id. § 540 cmt. a.
163. Id. § 540.
164. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Acco Brands, Inc., No. CV99-1877DT (MCX), 2000
WL 986995, at *21, *26 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000) (denying motion for summary judgment).
165. Id. at *21.
166. Id.
167. Some neo-classical economic theorists posit that sophisticated purchasers can use
their purchasing clout to avoid cartel prices, but the empirical evidence shows that even
corporate America pays supra-competitive prices as a result of price-fixing cartels. See
Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 38 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 559-63 (2007).
168. Kristy Holtfreter et al., Sociolegal Change in Consumer Fraud: From Victim-Of-
fender Interactions to Global Networks, 44 CRIME, LAw & SOCIAL CHANGE 251, 263
(2006); Michael Levi, White-Collar Crime Victimization, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECON-
SIDERED 172-73 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (noting that majority of fraud
victims in the United Kingdom were corporate entities).
169. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1759 n.497 (2003).
170. Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Integrating Competition Law and
Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 16 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1546106.
171. 290 F.3d 768, 775-76 (6th Cir. 2002). The court describes the practice of category
management as one that
varies from store to store, and involves managing product groups and busi-
ness units and customizing them on a store-by-store basis to satisfy customer
demands. The process can determine the quantity of items a store sells. For
instance, it allows retailers, based on such data as sales volume, to determine
which items should be allocated more shelf space. Manufacturers support
the efforts of retailers by presenting to them products or a combination of
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providing retailers misleading information. 172 It wanted to dupe the re-
tailers into believing, inter alia, that the monopolist's moist snuff products
sold better than the plaintiff's products, so that these retailers would
carry the monopolist's moist snuff and discontinue carrying the plaintiff's
products.' 73 (The monopolist also tortiously removed, discarded, and de-
stroyed the plaintiff's point-of-sale advertising racks without the store
management's permission, and trained its employees to take advantage of
inattentive store clerks with various ruses such as obtaining nominal per-
mission to reorganize or neaten the store racks in an effort to destroy the
plaintiff's racks.) 174
Under the Treatise's presumption and elements, which the Sixth Cir-
cuit subsequently adopted in part,175 the product disparagement claims
should have been summarily dismissed.176 These retailers, which in-
cluded Wal-Mart, knew the subject matter and sought to maximize profits
from moist snuff sales through the optimal selection of products. 77 Re-
tailers reviewed the monopolist's plan-o-gram proposals as to which
moist snuff products should be displayed, and how.'78 Some retailers
compared the category captain's proposals with their own independent
analysis.'7 9 Moreover, a Kroger supermarket executive testified that any
manufacturer "trying to use category management practices to control
competition, in his store anyway, would be 'committing suicide.'"180
Recognizing that falsely disparaging a competitor and its financial con-
dition can constitute exclusionary practices under Section 2,181 the Sixth
Circuit in Conwood held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence
that these sophisticated retailers were indeed duped.182 The monopolist
provided retailers "skewed" national sales figures, which did "not always
represent local product movement in stores," and false information, such
as inflated sales data, in order to get the retailers to maintain the monop-
olist's poorly-selling items while dropping or "burying" the plaintiff's bet-
ter-selling products.183 The plaintiff's expert testified that retailers, while
products that are more profitable and "plan-o-grams" describing how, and
which, products should be displayed.
Id. at 775.
172. Id. at 788.
173. Id. at 783.
174. Id.
175. Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2003).
176. See TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 782a2, at 324-25.




181. Id. at 784 (citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 854 n.30 (6th Cir.
1979)); see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32
(1985) (noting that exclusionary conduct involves behavior that tends to impair the oppor-
tunities of rivals and either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an
unnecessary restrictive way).
182. Conwood, 290 F.3d at 795.
183. Id. at 776, 785-86, 790.
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quite sophisticated, nonetheless knew less than the monopolist about the
pricing and profitability of moist snuff.184 The deception had its desired
effect. For if retailers actually preferred the monopolist's slower-selling
moist snuff products, the monopolist had no need to deceive them.
The Treatise's fifth element 185-requiring the monopolist's misrepre-
sentation to continue for prolonged periods-is arbitrary. One cannot
assume that a monopolist's deception, once exposed and not repeated, is
harmless, or that prolonged deception is necessarily harmful.186 An ef-
fective lie need not be repeated to preempt a nascent competitive
threat-one misrepresentation may suffice.187 To increase its market
power through network effects, a company may employ deceit to tip de-
mand toward its product.188 Once attaining a monopoly, the company
need not continue to employ deceit to maintain its power. 189 Moreover,
the courts and Treatise never explain why society must endure a monopo-
list's deceit over a long, but not yet prolonged, period. 190 The critical
issue is whether the misrepresentation reasonably appears capable of
making a significant contribution to maintaining or attaining monopoly
power-not how often, or for how long, the monopolist deceived the
marketplace.
Finally, the Treatise's sixth element-the misrepresentation is not read-
ily susceptible of neutralization or other offset by rivals' 91-makes little
sense. The Sixth Circuit surmised, based on this element, that "false ad-
vertising would not damage competition . . . unless it was so difficult for
the plaintiff to counter that it could potentially exclude competition." 1 9 2
Again, a rational profit-maximizing monopolist recognizes that deceit in-
volves costs. If a smaller rival can effectively neutralize or offset the mo-
nopolist's misrepresentations with little cost and effort, neoclassical
economic theory predicts that there would be no benefit in engaging in
such deception. The monopolist risks the loss of its reputation, goodwill,
and sales, while incurring the costs of a futile advertising campaign. Thus
a rational monopolist will attempt such deception only where the likely
gains exceed the costs (even if rivals attempt to counteract it). The fact
that a monopolist invested in a deceptive advertising campaign signals
that, despite the attendant risks, the monopolist expected to benefit. 193
Even if the monopolist is behaving irrationally, liability should not de-
184. Id. at 776. The court also relied on the testimony of plaintiff's marketing expert
that, by deceiving the retailers, the monopolist abused its position of trust as category cap-
tain. Id. at 786.
185. TREATISE, supra note 111, § 782, at 327.
186. See e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing how a single event can
harm a competitor).
187. See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., supra note 152.
191. TREATISE, supra note 111, § 782, at 327.
192. Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2003).
193. E.g., id.
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pend on the rivals' actions. The courts should dismiss the Section 2 claim
for lack of causation, if the deception does not appear to be reasonably
capable of making a significant contribution to attaining or maintaining
monopoly power.
A monopolist can use deception strategically to foreclose certain facets
of competition. Suppose, for example, the dominant Internet access pro-
vider deceptively advertises high-speed Internet connections to maintain
existing customers and enroll new ones. If sufficient widespread confu-
sion ensues as to what constitutes high-speed Internet access and whether
the monopoly or its smaller rivals offer faster Internet connections, cus-
tomers may distrust any competitor's claims about high-speed connec-
tions. 194 Thus a monopolist can desensitize consumers to a competitor's
advertised claim and thereby blunt an entrant's ability to gain a competi-
tive advantage based on that advertised benefit.
Even if smaller rivals could expose a monopolist's deception, why
should courts require them to incur such costs? This burden is inconsis-
tent with the Sherman Act's purpose and contravenes the legal maxim
that the law helps those "who are deceived, not those deceiving." 195 Sup-
pose, for example, that a monopolist over several years sent the health-
care community mass mailings that falsely disparaged a smaller rival.
Suppose the smaller rival could counter the monopolist's deception, as
was the case in American Council, by incurring the cost in responding to
defendant's three mass mailings to between 7,000 and 8,000 hospitals and
insurance companies.196 Why should the law mandate such an undertak-
ing? The deception directly harms consumers and raises rivals' corrective
advertising costs. 197 Moreover, the fringe firm or new entrant is situated
differently than the monopolist.' 98 A monopolist would prefer an entrant
to expend capital defending its image rather than in expanding its busi-
ness, and thereby threaten the monopoly. Advertising can be an effective
entry barrier.199 Generally, it is costlier for entrants to launch a new
194. This theory arose in a in a case involving a telephone monopolist's furnishing in-
side wire maintenance service to its residential and certain business customers. See, e.g.,
Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 89-CIV-NESBIT, 1994 WL 912242, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 1, 1994). Plaintiffs alleged that the monopolist created widespread confusion in the
market, which thereby raised entry barriers. Id. An entrant would have to engage in cor-
rective advertising, which itself was expensive. Id. Second, the entrant, despite its correc-
tive advertising efforts, had no assurance of capturing all the business diverted away from
the monopoly because customers could switch to another competitor. Id. Third, given the
low failure rate for a telephone wire, competitors could not quickly recoup the cost of
corrective advertising. Id. While questioning the amount of evidence in support of the
theory, the court accepted the plaintiffs' theory of harm and denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs' two monopolization claims. Id. at *15.
195. See TRAYNER, supra note 109, at 73. One district court went so far as to hold that
an antitrust plaintiff could not prove an antitrust injury unless the competitor's deception
"threatened to or was driving [plaintiff] out of business." Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences
Int'l, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
196. Am. Council, 323 F.3d at 368.
197. See Davis, 1994 WL 912242, at *2.
198. See supra note 145.
199. Robert Smiley, Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence, 6 Irrr'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 167, 170-72 (1988). The surveyed executives were asked separately, for new and
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product and establish brand recognition than for an entrenched firm to
maintain its brand awareness. 200
The sixth element, like the Treatise's general presumption, can cause
courts to draw inconsistent presumptions with respect to false advertising
claims under the Sherman and Lanham Acts. When a firm disseminates
willfully deceptive, comparative advertising, courts under the Lanham
Act do not require the competitor to show that the misrepresentation was
not readily susceptible of neutralization or other offset.201 Instead, under
the Lanham Act, courts increasingly presume causation and harm from
intentional deception: "Such a presumption forces the willful fabricator-
rather than its intended victim-to bear the burden of demonstrating that
its deliberate misrepresentations did not result in harm to its competitor.
Thus, it discourages companies from engaging in deliberately deceptive
advertising campaigns, protecting consumers and competitors alike." 202
While courts under the Lanham Act are increasingly presuming harm
from deliberately deceptive comparative advertising campaigns, a smaller
rival in a Sherman Act claim faces the opposite presumption: it must first
prove that it could not readily neutralize or otherwise offset the monopo-
list's deception.203
Finally, at times, smaller competitors may follow the monopolist's lead
by engaging in similar deception rather than exposing it and facing the
monopolist's wrath.204 Antitrust scholar Robert Steiner, who was also
the former president of the Kenner Products toy company, described his
existing mature products, how frequently their company engages in certain behavior, in-
cluding advertising and promoting the product intensively for the purpose of creating suffi-
cient product loyalty that potential rivals would find entry less attractive. Id. Of the seven
tactics identified, advertising was the most frequently employed tactic to deter entry of new
products, and the second most frequently employed tactic for existing products. Id. at 172.
200. Prentice, supra note 23, at 1225 n.257 (collecting sources); see also U.S. Philips
Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that there was suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury could conclude "[tihat entry barriers to the rotary elec-
tric shaver market are substantial, if not high [because of] the need to have a well-known
brand with wide consumer acceptance, the limited number of brands that satisfy this re-
quirement, and the substantial advertising expenditures required to attain a foothold in the
market"); S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(recognizing that the "need to overcome brand preference established by the defendant's
having been first in the market or having made extensive 'image' advertising expenditures"
constitutes an entry barrier); Complaint at 8, United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No.
3:95-CV-3055-P, 1996 WL 351145, at *8 (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 12, 1995) ("[e]stablishing a
new successful brand of retail facial tissue in the United States is difficult, time-consuming
and costly" as "[a]dvertising and promotional expense for a new brand would exceed $25
million over a three-year introductory period").
201. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
202. Trilink Saw Chain, LLC v. Blount, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1321 (N.D. Ga.
2008); see also ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d 949, 953 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (upholding under the Lanham Act victim's recovery of $3.6 million in advertising
costs to respond to competitor's deceptive advertising campaign, which cost only $2.2
million).
203. TREATISE, supra note 111, § 782, at 327.
204. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474 n.21
(1992) (noting that "in an equipment market with relatively few sellers, competitors may
find it more profitable to adopt Kodak's service and parts policy than to inform the con-
sumers"); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1941) (reviewing the FTC
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concerns about the industry self-regulation of toy commercials in the
1960s and 1970s.2 0 5 Originally favoring industry self-policing, he feared
the greater anticompetitive consequences of deceptive advertising.206
Absent regulation, some toy manufacturers would air deceptive ads,
which would pull down the toy industry.207 Unless his company matched
"the exaggerations and sometimes the outright deceptions of certain com-
petitors, our commercials might not be exciting enough to move our toys
off the shelves."208 He foresaw bad commercials driving out the good
ones, rendering TV advertising relatively ineffective. 209 The Treatise
does not address this marketing dynamic. Instead, it requires the injured
consumers (who generally cannot challenge the deception under the Lan-
ham Act) to show why competitors could not readily neutralize or offset
the misrepresentation. 210
B. VAPORWARE
Vaporware involves company preannouncements of its products that
never materialize or arrive only much later than the announced delivery
date. 211 Such pre-announcements, a DOJ official noted, can serve vari-
ous purposes: "they can inform partners of new products to promote in-
teroperability, they can inform consumers of new products so they will
not be left stranded buying inferior or obsolete products, they can favora-
bly influence expectations to help establish new products, and, yes, they
can deter the introduction of rival products." 212
Monopolists can use vaporware to maintain their power. In knowingly
and falsely announcing the introduction of new products or technology in
the near future, a monopolist can prevent its sales from significantly shift-
ing to an entrant or fringe firm.2 1 3 Business executives in one survey self-
order finding Ford guilty of following industry leader General Motors in advertising a de-
ceptive six-percent financing plan).
205. Robert L. Steiner, Double Standards in the Regulation of Toy Advertising, 56 CIN-




209. Id. at 1264.
210. See TREATISE, supra note 111, § 782, at 327.
211. Andrew V. Leventis & Michelle R. Appelrouth, Are Section 2 Claims More Than
Mere Apparitions? The Legal Viability of Vaporware Claims, ANnTRUST, Spring 2001, at
82.
212. Carl Shapiro, Deputy Ass't Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Antitrust In Network Industries, Speech Before the American Law Institute and American
Bar Association Antitrust/Intellectual Property Claims in High Technology Markets 15
(Jan. 25, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/0593.htm.
213. Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274, 285 (D. Mass.
1995) (involving defendants who allegedly used vaporware to paralyze operating systems
technology markets and deter users from committing to other systems); In re Xerox Corp.,
86 F.T.C. 364, at *7 (July 29, 1975) (addressing anticompetitive monopolistic practices such
as "announcing new copier models and taking orders thereon before availability of such
copiers in response to introduction of competing copiers by actual or potential competi-
tors"); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Sherman
Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 878 (2000) (arguing that a monopolist has no rational eco-
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identified vaporware as a method designed primarily to prevent or slow
down entry. 214
Vaporware can be especially problematic in markets with network ef-
fects.215 A single event, such as a product pre-announcement, may tip
market demand toward a single standard or prevent the sales of a rival's
product from gaining momentum. 2 1 6 A software monopolist, for exam-
ple, can foster doubt that its rival's new product will be compatible with
its forthcoming technology. 217
Judge Stanley Sporkin was blunt: "'Vaporware' is a practice that is de-
ceitful on its face and everybody in the business community knows it." 2 1 8
If business leaders know that the practice is improper, asked Judge
Sporkin, why didn't the DOJ address it in its original antitrust settlement
with Microsoft? 219 Judge Sporkin, who foreshadowed several shortcom-
ings of the United States' original consent decree with Microsoft, 220 was
"terribly" bothered by the DOJ's failure. 221 The district court was "par-
ticularly concerned" that Microsoft unfairly maintained its operating sys-
tem monopoly by aggressively pre-announcing new products in the face
of its competitors' introducing possibly superior products.222 The United
nomic reason for knowingly making vaporware "other than to perpetuate or extend its
monopoly power").
214. Smiley, supra note 199, at 174-75. One empirical study showed how an entrant's
pre-announcement (Circuit City's preannouncement of DIVX technology) slowed down
the adoption of the incumbent DVD technology. David Dranove & Neil Gandal, The
DVD vs. DIVX Standard War: Empirical Evidence of Vaporware 8-20 (U.C. Berkeley
Competition & Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC 00-16, 2000), available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=10104context=iber/cpc. Because an en-
trant's product preannouncement had such a large effect, the authors suggest that an in-
cumbent's product preannouncement would likely have a larger effect. Id. at 20. "Hence
the general antitrust concern over vaporware is justified." Id.
215. Dranove & Gandal, supra note 214, at 1.
216. Leventis & Appelrouth, supra note 211, at 84.
217. Dranove & Gandal, supra note 214, at 19.
218. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft 1), 159 F.R.D. 318, 337 (D.D.C. 1995),
rev'd per curiam, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Judge Sporkin construed vaporware nar-
rowly as "the public announcement of a computer product before it is ready for market for
the sole purpose of causing consumers not to purchase a competitor's product that has
been developed and is either currently available for sale or momentarily about to enter the
market." Id. at 334.
219. Id. at 337.
220. Id. at 326 n.15. Judge Sporkin, for example, felt the consent decree, which covered
"only MS-DOS and Windows and its predecessor and successor products," was too narrow.
Id. at 333. Given "Microsoft's penchant for narrowly defining the antitrust laws," Judge
Sporkin feared "there may be endless debate as to whether a new operating system is
covered by the decree." Id. Moreover, the United States never showed how its proposed
decree "will open the market and remedy the unfair advantage Microsoft gained in the
market through its anticompetitive practices." Id. at 333-34. Judge Sporkin, at Microsoft's
request, was removed for "personal bias" against the company. United States v. Microsoft
Corp. (Microsoft II), 56 F.3d 1448, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The United States later unsuc-
cessfully challenged Microsoft's narrow construction of the consent decree. United States
v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 147 F.3d 935, 946-48 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Microsoft's oper-
ating software monopoly remains intact.
221. Microsoft 1, 159 F.R.D. at 337 (expressing that United States was "either incapable
or unwilling to deal effectively with a potential threat to this nation's economic well
being").
222. Id. at 335.
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States "refused to disclose what it knew about the [Vaporware] practice
or what investigation it had conducted with respect to it." 2 2 3 The district
court could not "ignore the obvious": a monopolist admittedly prean-
nounced solely to impact a competitor's product adversely.224 Conse-
quently, the district court considered the government's proposed
settlement with Microsoft to be ineffectual.225 To approve it would leave
the message that the "Microsoft is so powerful that neither the market
nor the Government is capable of dealing with all of its monopolistic
practices." 226
Allegations of vaporware's anticompetitive effects resurfaced when a
competitor, not the United States, sued Microsoft under the Sherman
Act.2 2 7 The plaintiff in Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Caldera I) al-
leged that the monopolist's vaporware and other illegal conduct drove it
from the market. 2 2 8 Plaintiff alleged the following: In the late 1980s,
Microsoft was alarmed over the enthusiasm for plaintiff's operating sys-
tem, which, as Microsoft internally admitted, was "vastly superior" to its
operating system.229 Microsoft sought to bargain for its rival's exit from
the market.230 When that failed, and after plaintiff's software captured
six percent of the worldwide operating software market, Microsoft turned
to vaporware. 231 The monopolist's vaporware campaign caused com-
puter manufacturers to postpone any decision to switch from Microsoft's
223. Id. Microsoft claimed these vaporware charges were "entirely false."
224. Id.
225. Id. at 337.
226. Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court exceeded its powers
under the Tunney Act, and remanded the case to a different judge with instructions to
enter the proposed decree. Microsoft II, 56 F.3d at 1464-65. The D.C. Circuit held that
the district court need not enter the consent decree if it "appears to make a mockery of
judicial power. Short of that eventuality, the Tunney Act cannot be interpreted as an au-
thorization for a district judge to assume the role of Attorney General." Id. at 1462. Con-
gress disagreed with the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the Tunney Act, and Congress
amended the Act "to effectuate the original Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney
Act and to ensure that United States settlements of civil antitrust suits are in the public
interest." Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118
Stat. 661 (2004). Because "the purpose of the Thnney Act was to ensure that the entry of
antitrust consent judgments is in the public interest," it "would misconstrue the meaning
and Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney Act to limit the discretion of district
courts to review antitrust consent judgments solely to determining whether entry of those
consent judgments would make a 'mockery of the judicial function."' Id.
227. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Caldera I), 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1299 (D. Utah
1999); Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Caldera II), 87 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1247-48 (D. Utah
1999).
228. Caldera 1, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1299.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the monopolist made preemptive false and misleading
announcements of its forthcoming, competitive MS-DOS 5.0 and Windows products. Id.
Microsoft stated that its MS-DOS 5.0 software (which it claimed was similar to plaintiff's
software) would be publicly available by September 1990 (which was nine months before
the software actually came on the market). Id. Plaintiff relied on Microsoft's internal doc-
uments that stated one goal of its "aggressive leak" campaign was to "diffuse potential
excitement/momentum from the [plaintiff's] DR DOS 5.0 announcement." Id. at 1300.
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to plaintiff's operating system.232 To preempt this competitive threat,
Microsoft also launched a campaign of "fear, uncertainty, and doubt"
(FUD) against plaintiff and its operating software. Microsoft deceived
computer manufacturers that plaintiff's and Microsoft's operating
software were incompatible. 233 Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of
Microsoft's vaporware, FUD campaign, and other anticompetitive con-
duct, it withdrew from the market. 234 Soon after plaintiff's exit,
Microsoft announced that its Chicago (later dubbed Windows 95)
software, which Microsoft originally said would be released in 1993 or
1994 (and on which plaintiff's Novell DOS would not run), was delayed
and might be unavailable until August 1995.235
The district court denied Microsoft's partial summary judgment motion
relating to its alleged vaporware activities.236 Microsoft's vaporware and
FUD campaign, when viewed with the other alleged exclusionary behav-
ior, may support a Section 2 violation.237 Monopolists, the court recog-
nized, have no general duty to predisclose innovations to competitors.238
But monopolists cannot eradicate their competitors through anticompeti-
tive means, including fraud.239 Microsoft later settled for an estimated
$275 million.240
Complaints over companies' vaporware practices have continued.
Wired Magazine annually announces its Vaporware Awards for the tech
industry's biggest, brashest, and most baffling unfulfilled promises.241 In
2008, Microsoft won a vaporware award for its Internet Explorer 8.242
Yet few antitrust plaintiffs have challenged vaporware; even fewer claims
have survived summary judgment.
232. Id. One Microsoft executive wrote, "virtually all of our OEMs worldwide were
informed about DOS 5, which diffused DRI's ability to capitalize on a window of opportu-
nity with these OEMs." Id. (quoting Pl.'s Ex. 62).
233. Id. at 1301. To "slaughter" plaintiff "before they get stronger," Microsoft repeated
its vaporware and FUD campaign when plaintiff released its new operating software. Id. at
1302 (quoting Pt.'s Ex. 175). To foster the impression of incompatibility between plaintiffs
and Microsoft's software, a Microsoft employee said, "We need to create the reputation for
problems and incompatibilities to undermine confidence to [plaintiff's software] drdos6; so
people will make judgments against it without knowing details or fa[c]ts." Id. at 1303
(quoting Pl.'s Ex. 227).
234. Id. at 1304.
235. Id.
236. Caldera II, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (D. Utah 1999).
237. Id.
238. Caldera 1, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
239. Id. at 1306, 1317; Caldera II, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. As to whether Microsoft made
knowingly false statements, plaintiff relied on internal company statements of the problem
"motivating people to achieve 'fake' ship dates" and "Lying to people on the team about
schedules. Morale hit to the team." Caldera, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
240. Settlement: Microsoft Settles Unfair Competition Suit By Caldera, 7 ANDREws AN-
TITRUST LITIG. REP., no. 7, Jan. 2000, at 7.
241. See Michael Calore, Vaporware 2009: A Call for Submissions, WIRED
(Dec. 7, 2009, 7:15 PM), http://www.wired.comlepicenter/2009/12/vaporware-2009-a-call-for
-submission/.
242. Wired Staff, Vaporware 2008: Crushing Disappointments, False Promises and Plain
Old BS, WIRED (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/
news/2008/12/YE8_vaporware?currentPage=all.
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The issue then is the appropriate antitrust standard for evaluating
claims of a monopolist's vaporware. The DOJ recognized that product
pre-announcements may violate the Sherman Act if they were knowingly
false when made and contributed to the acquisition or maintenance of
market share.2 4 3 Judge Sporkin, however, criticized the United States'
"rather narrow" view of vaporware: the government had adopted a crimi-
nal standard when Microsoft was accused of repeatedly preannouncing
products to freeze the current software market and defeat the marketing
plans of competitors that had products ready for the market.2 4 4
But, the DOJ's legal standard was consistent with the standard for
common law misrepresentation of intention. Under the common law, a
defendant can be liable for its statement of its present intent to carry out
a future action, when the defendant in making such a representation had
no such intent. 24 5 Plaintiff must prove that the representation was false
and material when made, and the defendant knew it was false (i.e., the
defendant knew it did not have the intention to do or not do the particu-
lar act) when making the statement. 24 6 Proof of scienter is critical and
cannot be inferred solely by defendant's later nonperformance. 247 Other-
wise, a breach of contract for nonperformance can be characterized as
deception. 2 4 8
Not surprisingly, the few courts that evaluated antitrust claims pre-
mised on vaporware required the antitrust plaintiff to prove that the mo-
nopolist's early product announcement was knowingly false or misleading
when made. 24 9 Professor Prentice offered a useful expansion of this stan-
dard-namely, plaintiffs should prevail under Section 2 for their
vaporware claims if the monopolist "(a) did not really believe the an-
nouncement when made, (b) had no reasonable basis to believe the an-
nouncement when it was made, or (c) was aware at the time the
announcement was made of specific facts that contradicted the
announcement." 2 5 0
243. Microsoft I, 159 F.R.D. 318, 336 (D.D.C. 1995), rev'd per curiam, 56 F.3d 1448
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
244. Id.
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 530; see, e.g., Milwaukee
Auction Galleries, Ltd. v. Chalk, 13 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1994).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 530 cmt. b. "If the statement
is honestly made and the intention in fact exists, one who acts in justifiable reliance upon it
cannot maintain an action of deceit if the maker for any reason changes his mind and fails
or refuses to carry his expressed intention into effect." Id.
247. Id. at cmt. d.
248. See id.
249. See, e.g., AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 920 F. Supp. 1287, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd, 181 F.3d 216, 231 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that knowingly making a false prean-
nouncement of a product service can constitute predatory conduct); MCI Commc'ns Corp.
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1128-30 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that to be exclusion-
ary, early announcement must be "knowingly false or misleading"); ILC Peripherals Leas-
ing Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. 458 F. Supp. 423, 442 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding no
evidence that the product preannouncement was knowingly false), affd per curiam sub
nom. Memorex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
250. Prentice, supra note 23, at 1254-55; see also Caldera II, 87 F. 87 F. Supp. 2d 1244,
1248 (D. Utah 1999) (noting that since "[p]roving state of mind is a difficult task[,]" "in-
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One defense of vaporware is that monopolists are unlikely to repeat
their deceptions with rational customers successfully. 251 This claim, as
Caldera I shows, proves too much.2 5 2 Some monopolists have engaged in
vaporware over long periods.253  Professor Prentice noted that
Microsoft's failure to deliver its vaporware promises did not prevent it
from dominating for over twenty-five years the operating system market
and leveraging itself into a leading position in many markets for applica-
tions software.254 Even isolated incidents of vaporware can be anticom-
petitive. 255 A monopolist need only deceive occasionally to preempt a
nascent competitive threat.256 As for any ensuing recrimination, a mo-
nopolist might prefer a tarnished reputation than competition.
C. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
Businesses may collaborate through standard-setting organizations to
establish industry standards, codes, or product specifications that market
participants can rely upon in making products. 257 These standard-setting
organizations, like the National Fire Protection Association in Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., can have significant market
power.258 Their standard setting can also lead to significant procompeti-
tive 259 or anticompetitive effects. 26 0 In industries with network effects,
quiry into reasonableness will most likely be relevant to assessing whether a statement was
knowingly false or misleading").
251. Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J.
ECON. 113, 118 (1989).
252. See generally Caldera 1, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999).
253. Prentice, supra note 23, at 1208.
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 215-217 and accompanying text.
257. PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION, supra note 31, at 33.
258. 486 U.S. 492, 492-93 (1988) (holding that a competitor's efforts to affect the prod-
uct standard-setting process of a private association was not immune from antitrust liability
under the Noerr doctrine because state and local governments widely adopted the associa-
tion's standards into law). The private National Fire Protection Association, among other
things, set and published highly influential product standards and codes relating to fire
protection. Id. at 495.
One of the codes it publishes is the National Electrical Code, which estab-
lished product and performance requirements for the design and installation
of electrical wiring systems . . . was the most influential electrical code in the
nation.... [P]rivate certification laboratories, such as Underwriters Labora-
tories, normally will not list and label an electrical product that does not
meet Code standards; many underwriters will refuse to insure structures that
are not built in conformity with the Code; and many electrical inspectors,
contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls outside the
Code.
Id. at 495-96.
259. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, § 102, 118 Stat. 661, 661 (2004); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297,
308-09 (3d Cir. 2007); PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION, supra note 31, at 33-34.
260. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 5.7c1, at 282 (2d ed. 2006). If, for example, the standard-set-
ting organization's members agree to purchase only products that comply with their organ-
ization's standard, and if the members have sufficient market clout, their group boycott can
be anticompetitive. Id.
[Vol. 631102
2010] How Do Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception? 1103
once the standard-setting organization chooses the technology, and its
members and others develop products adopting that technology, it can be
"time consuming and expensive to adopt a different technology." 2 6 1 Be-
cause the "process of establishing a standard displaces competition,"
noted the FTC, the use of deception to influence a standard-setting body
can "undermine competition in an entire industry, raise prices to consum-
ers, and reduce choices." 262
Standard setting often involves information asymmetries that can fos-
ter deception. As information is more widely dispersed and as innovation
and the quest for productive efficiency lead to further specialization of
knowledge, no one completely grasps the details of how products are
made and sold.2 6 3 Synthesizing the many areas of expertise is often a
time-consuming and costly process. 264 One benefit of standard-setting
organizations is their collecting and synthesizing disparate areas of spe-
cialized knowledge into a standard, code, or product specification. 265 The
private standard-setting organization in Allied Tube & Conduit, for exam-
ple, drew on the expertise of over 31,500 individual and group members
representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine,
firefighters, and government.266 Few outside the standard-setting organi-
zation have the time, resources, or desire to replicate the standard-setting
process and draw a different conclusion. 267 Instead, outsiders, like the
many state and local governments in Allied Tube & Conduit, often will
defer to the collective decision of the standard-setting organization and
routinely adopt the standard-setting organization's codes "into law with
little or no change." 268 Indeed the state and local governments may "lack
the resources or technical expertise to second-guess it." 2 6 9
If defendant attains or maintains its monopoly by deceiving the private
standard-setting organization (or otherwise manipulating its process), this
261. Written Submission of the United States, OECD-COMPETITION POLICY
ROUNDTABLES: POTENTIAL PRO-COMPETITIVE AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF
TRADE/BUSINEss ASSOCIATIONs, DAF/COMP (2007) 45, at 218 (2007), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/28/41646059.pdf.
262. Statement of the F.T.C., In re Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, No. 0510094, at 2
(Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122statement.pdf.
263. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, The Technostructure, in THE ESSENTIAL GAL-
BRAITH 71-72 (2000). The power in a modern corporation, observed John Kenneth Gal-
braith, lies not with the CEO, but with the internal collective decision-making bodies. Id.
at 71. To manufacture and sell a new automobile, the carmaker must collect internally
many departments' expertise (such as engineering, marketing, finance, sales, etc.). Id. at
67-69. The collective decision-making body collects this disparate expertise in determining
the car's design, suggested price point, and options. Id. Although the CEOs may question
some aspects of the decisions, they lack the detailed expertise to effectively replicate the
analysis that went into the decisions and draw a different conclusion. Id. at 71-72.
264. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 502 (1988).
265. See id. at 495.
266. 486 U.S. at 495.
267. Id. at 502.
268. Id. at 495.
269. Id. at 502.
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raises antitrust concerns. 270 One concern is the patent "hold-up" situa-
tion.271 Such deception can stifle the efficiencies gained from standard
setting if members hedge their bets for potential hold-up or forego stan-
dard setting altogether.272 To avoid hold-ups, standard-setting organiza-
tions can require their members to disclose any current or prospective
intellectual property rights at the onset of the standard-setting process
and to commit to license any disclosed technologies that are incorporated
in the standard on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms.273
An emerging and positive trend is the competition agencies' recogni-
tion of the significant anticompetitive risks of deceptive and other inde-
pendently wrongful conduct in the standard-setting process.274 One
would expect, then, that the courts would also take a hard line. Instead,
the Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit have recently applied different legal
standards to evaluate such risks.
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., the Third Circuit took a hard
line in addressing the hold-up problem.275 By misrepresenting the cost of
implementing its technology, the deceiver can obtain "an unfair advan-
270. To mitigate the antitrust risks, the private association can "promulgate safety stan-
dards based on the merits of objective expert judgments" and have procedures to "prevent
the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in sti-
fling product competition." Id. at 501.
271. PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION, supra note 31, at 35 n.11. A standard-
setting organization must weigh ex ante the benefits and costs of using a member's technol-
ogy versus alternative technologies in a proposed standard. Id. at 35-36. To assess accu-
rately the costs and benefits, the organization must know the current or prospective
intellectual property (IP) rights in the different technologies. Id. If the organization can-
not cost effectively ascertain or police its members' current or prospective IP rights in that
technology, the organization must rely on its members' truthful disclosures of any IP rights.
Id. at 36. A member can conceal its IP interests to the standard-setting organization and
falsely promise to deal fairly. See id. at 7. After the deceiver's intellectual property is
incorporated in the standard, other industry participants start designing, testing, and pro-
ducing goods that conform to the standard. Id. at 35. Switching to other technologies or
standards becomes increasingly difficult. The greater the switching costs, the greater the
deceitful company's market power. Id. at 37-38. Once the industry is locked-in, the de-
ceitful company reveals its IP rights and "holds up" the industry participants with monop-
oly licensing fees. Id.
272. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (FTC Aug. 2, 2006) (citing con-
cerns from industry participants).
273. PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION, supra note 31, at 36; Daniel G. Swan-
son & William J. Baumol, Reasonable & Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards
Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTrrRusT L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
274. In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305, 2005 WL 2003365 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2005)
(FTC consent decree) (finding that defendant, while pursuing a patent, "misrepresented to
CARB that certain gasoline research was non-proprietary and in the public domain"; per-
mitting defendant to enforce its patent rights could result, the FTC estimated, "in over
$500 million of additional consumer costs annually"); In re Dell Computer Corp., 121
F.T.C. 616, 618 (May 20, 1996) (finding that after certifying having no relevant patents,
Dell sought to enforce its patents adopted by standard-setting organization); J. Thomas
Rosch, The Common Law of Section 2: Is It Still Alive and Well?, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1163, 1173 (2008) (stating that the FTC was "not convinced that deceptive conduct in the
context of a standard-setting process could or should be considered presumptively legal,
much less legal per se").
275. 501 F.3d 297, 310-13 (3d Cir. 2007).
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tage and bias the competitive process in favor of that technology's inclu-
sion in the standard." 276 "Deception in a consensus-driven private
standard-setting environment harms the competitive process by obscuring
the costs of including proprietary technology in a standard and increasing
the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the pat-
ent holder." 277 Consequently, the Third Circuit held "that (1) in a con-
sensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, (2) a patent
holder's intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary tech-
nology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with an [standard-setting organiza-
tion's] reliance on that promise when including the technology in a
standard, and (4) the patent holder's subsequent breach of that promise,
is actionable anticompetitive conduct." 278 The Third Circuit did not ad-
dress the element of causation directly. 279 But its approach was consis-
tent with the common law approach. First, the Third Circuit recognized
that a firm's commitment to license on FRAND terms was "a factor-
and an important factor-that the [standard-setting organization] will
consider in evaluating the suitability of a given proprietary technology
vis-a-vis competing technologies." 2 8 0 Second, the court recognized that
the standard-setting organization "might have chosen nonproprietary
technologies for inclusion in the standard," 281 and "even if [defendant's]
technology was the only candidate for inclusion in the standard," the or-
ganization may still have rejected it.2 82 "Thus, the allegations of the
Complaint foreclose[d] the possibility" that the inclusion of defendant's
technology in the standard "was inevitable." 2 8 3
In contrast to the Third Circuit's hard line approach, the D.C. Circuit in
Rambus Inc. v. F. T. C. created a new causation standard that undermined
the Sherman Act's legislative aim. 2 8 4 The FTC, in its administrative pro-
ceeding, found Rambus liable for patent hold-up.285 The D.C. Circuit set
aside the FTC's order.286 This alone was not startling. Other federal
courts dismissed related private actions due to evidentiary deficiencies. 287
276. Id. at 313.
277. Id. at 314.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 313.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 316.
283. Id.
284. 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
285. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (finding that
"Rambus's conduct was calculated to mislead [the standard-setting organization's] mem-
bers by fostering the belief that Rambus neither had, nor was seeking, relevant patents that
would be enforced" against products compliant with the standard-setting organization,
which required disclosure of relevant intellectual property).
286. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d at 469.
287. E.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (not-
ing "staggering lack of defining details" in the standard-setting organization's patent pol-
icy); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(finding that organization's written disclosure policies "did not clearly require members to
disclose information" about IP, members never legally agreed to do so, and members
never had "clearly defined expectation" of such disclosure requirements).
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The D.C. Circuit, like the other courts, could have found that the stan-
dard-setting organization's disclosure obligations were ill-defined or that
there was insufficient evidence that Rambus fraudulently concealed in-
formation. The FTC, while disappointed, could have prosecuted similar
violations, when presented with better facts.
Instead, the D.C. Circuit construed the Sherman Act, a law aimed at
protecting the public from monopolists' unfair business practices, 288 into
a safe-haven for anticompetitive deception. The FTC failed to prove mo-
nopolization, the court held, because it "failed to demonstrate that
Rambus's conduct was exclusionary under settled principles of antitrust
law."289 Rambus's conduct was not exclusionary, the court argued, be-
cause the FTC "expressly left open the likelihood that [the standard-set-
ting organization] would have standardized Rambus's technologies even
if Rambus had disclosed its intellectual property." 290 Essentially, the
FTC had to prove that the standard-setting organization would have ac-
ted differently (i.e., standardized other technologies) had it been told the
truth (i.e., known the full scope of Rambus's intellectual property).
Rather than applying "settled principles of antitrust law," the D.C. Cir-
cuit misconstrued the legal standard for causation in two respects.
First, the court misconstrued the causation standard for deception. It is
often difficult to predict what the victim would have done but for the
deception. Given this difficulty, causation in deception cases often de-
pends on issues of materiality and reliance.291 For example, in deciding
what to do, a reasonable person would not attach importance to immate-
rial representations. 292 Likewise, a person must rely on the misrepresen-
tation in acting or refraining from acting.293 So a misrepresentation that
is immaterial or that the plaintiff never heard generally cannot cause
injury.294
Common law fraud, however, does not mandate proof that but for the
misrepresentation, the fraud victims would have acted differently. 295 A
strict "but for" analysis, said Maryland's highest court in Nails v. S & R,
Inc., is one way, but not the only way, fraud victims can establish reli-
ance.2 9 6 Thus, the common law recognizes that other factors besides mis-
representation can influence the tort victim. 2 9 7 Plaintiffs need only show
that the misrepresentation "played a substantial part, and [was] a sub-
288. See supra Part II.A.
289. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d at 463.
290. Id. at 466.
291. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 538.
292. Id.
293. Id. § 537.
294. Id. § 538. An exception exists when the defendant knows that the plaintiff likely
regards the representation as important (say his horoscope), even though a reasonable
person would not. Id. § 538 cmt. f.
295. Id. § 546 cmt. b. ("It is not even necessary that [plaintiffs] would not have acted or
refrained from acting as [they] did unless [they] had relied on the misrepresentation.").
296. 639 A.2d 660, 669 (Md. 1994).
297. Id.
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stantial factor," in influencing their conduct.298 Fraud victims do not
have to prove that their "reliance upon the truth of the fraudulent mis-
representation be the sole or even the predominant or decisive factor in
influencing [their] conduct." 299
For example, in Nails, the plaintiff employees accused their former em-
ployer of deceiving them about their compensation.300 On cross-exami-
nation, each plaintiff was asked, "'if you had been told at the time of hire
about the [specific commission practice] you would have still taken the
job, would you not?"' Each plaintiff responded, "'I don't know."'o30 De-
fendant argued there was no reliance as a matter of law.3 0 2 To establish
fraud's reliance element, the defendant argued, plaintiffs had to show
that if they were told the truth, then they would not have worked for the
defendant.303 Given plaintiffs' "equivocal answers [during cross-exami-
nation], the "but for" test was not met and, therefore, there was no reli-
ance as a matter of law." 304 The Maryland Court of Appeals
disagreed.305 Defendant's strict "but for" analysis was not the only way
to establish reliance.3m The court "long recognized that the misrepresen-
tation need not have been the only motivation for the plaintiff's actions; it
is sufficient that the misrepresentation substantially induced the plaintiff
to act."307 For good measure, the court cited the Restatement 308 and
Prosser. 309 Because "each plaintiff testified that the amount he or she
was to be paid was of the 'utmost importance' in determining to take the
job", this "evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that each
plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations." 3 10 Consequently,
the D.C. Circuit's causation standard is inconsistent with the common law
standard for fraud.311
The irony is that the FTC sued under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 19, § 546 cmt. b.
299. Id.
300. Nails, 639 A.2d at 661-62.







308. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 (1977)).
309. Id. at 669-70.
[I]t is not required that the defendant shall have been the sole cause of the
damage; and indeed it is seldom, if ever, that the plaintiff is not influenced to
some extent by many other factors, most of which are not connected with the
defendant at all. It is enough that the representation has had a material influ-
ence upon the plaintiff's conduct, and been a substantial factor in bringing
about his action. It is not necessary that the representation be the para-
mount, or the decisive, inducement which tipped the scales, so long as it plays
a substantial part in affecting the plaintiff's decision. . . . The question be-
comes one of fact, as to whether substantial weight was given to the repre-
sentation, and it usually is for the jury.
Id. at 670 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 715 (4th ed. 1971)).
310. Id.
311. Compare id., with Rambus v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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in the context of deception claims further relaxes the reliance element. 312
Section 5 only requires evidence that the misrepresentation would likely
deceive consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances in a mate-
rial respect. 313 Courts do not require proof that consumers actually and
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or would have behaved differ-
ently but for the deception. 314
Thus, the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the causation standard for decep-
tion in requiring the FTC to speculate what the standard-setting organiza-
tion would have done had Rambus truthfully disclosed its intellectual
property. 315 One could intelligibly inquire whether the monopolist's de-
ception "had a tendency to deceive or was likely to influence"316 the stan-
dard-setting organization (or alternatively, as the Court did in
Qualcomm, whether the monopolist's deception was an important factor
in the standard-setting organization's decision). 317 But according to the
D.C. Circuit, Rambus's misrepresentation must be the predominant or
sole factor, namely "the standard-setting organization would not have
adopted the standard in question but for the misrepresentation or
omission."318
Second, the D.C. Circuit misconstrued the causation standard for a mo-
nopolization claim. Rambus's alleged deception, the court reasoned,
could not affect competition if it was possible that the standard-setting
organization "in the world that would have existed but for Rambus's de-
ception, would have standardized the very same technologies." 3 1 9 This
standard eviscerates Section 2. The possibility always exists that but for
312. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006). Viewing
Rambus as a monopolization case, the FTC analyzed Rambus's allegedly deceptive con-
duct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. The FTC applied two modifications to its
Section 5 legal standard. First, for Rambus's allegedly deceptive conduct to be actionable,
Rambus must have acted "willfully," as opposed to inadvertently or negligently. Id. Sec-
ond, while Section 5 "does not require proof of competitive harm," under Section 2, defen-
dant's deceptive conduct "must harm the competitive process." Id. Thus the
anticompetitive effect of Rambus's alleged deceptive course of conduct must "outweigh
any procompetitive benefit." Id. But this last requirement is nonsensical. Deception is
morally and legally culpable; balancing is not needed.
313. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 63, § 10.3, at 770.
314. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); FTC v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); see also PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 63,
§ 10.3, at 770 ("Time and again, defendants' pleas that there was no consumer testimony or
other evidence of actual deception have been rejected by reviewing courts, because the
Commission need only find a tendency to deceive based on its own examination."). Simi-
larly, under the Lanham Act, plaintiffs need only show that the misrepresentation "had a
tendency to deceive and was likely to influence purchasers," but plaintiffs need not prove
that purchasers relied solely on the misrepresentation. Williams Elec., Inc. v. Bally Mfg.
Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding that there was an issue of fact as to
whether manufacturer's representation had tendency to deceive and was likely to influence
purchasers even though distributors were sophisticated purchasers who did not make their
purchasing decisions solely on the basis of promotional materials).
315. Rambus v. FTC, 522 F.3d at 466.
316. Williams Elec., Inc., 568 F. Supp. at 1284 (emphasis in original).
317. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
318. Id. (quoting 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP & ANTrrmUsT § 35.5, at 35-45 (Supp.
2008)).
319. Id. at 466-67.
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the monopolist's exclusionary conduct consumers might have purchased
the monopolist's product or an entrant might have failed. "[N]either
plaintiffs nor the court can confidently reconstruct a product's hypotheti-
cal technological development in a world absent the defendant's exclu-
sionary conduct," recognized the unanimous D.C. Circuit sitting en banc
in Microsoft.3 2 0 To "require that § 2 liability turn on a plaintiff's ability or
inability to reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace absent a defendant's
anticompetitive conduct would only encourage monopolists to take more
and earlier anticompetitive action." 321 Thus, to deter monopolistic
abuses, Section 2 largely makes the defendant "'suffer the uncertain con-
sequences of its own undesirable conduct.'"322 An antitrust plaintiff
need only show "the type of conduct that is reasonably capable of con-
tributing significantly to a defendant's continued monopoly power." 323
Consequently, unlike the FTC in Rambus, the United States in
Microsoft never had to prove that but for Microsoft's exclusionary con-
duct, the original equipment computer manufacturers would have acted
differently. It was sufficient for the United States to show that but for
Microsoft's exclusionary license restrictions on its Windows software, the
original equipment manufacturers could have (not necessarily they would
have) promoted multiple Internet access providers and browsers,324 and
but for Microsoft's integration of its Internet browser with Windows, the
original equipment manufacturers could have removed Microsoft's In-
ternet browser and "might have chosen to pre-install" a competing In-
ternet browser. 325
The FTC satisfied the causation standard, as applied in Microsoft. The
FTC found that other companies, which presumably disclosed their IP
interests, competed with Rambus to be the technology chosen for the
standard. 326 Rambus's deception concerned a material issue, and the
standard-setting organization actually relied on this deception in choosing
among the alternative technologies.327
320. 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
321. Id.
322. Id. (quoting TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 651c, at 78).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 63.
325. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
326. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. 2006) (finding that
"[a]lternative technologies were available when JEDEC chose the Rambus technologies,
and could have been substituted for the Rambus technologies had Rambus disclosed its
patent position"). The standard-setting organization members-"the principal buyers of
the relevant technologies-gave these alternatives serious, searching consideration; in fact,
the technologies as to which Rambus subsequently revealed patent claims sometimes were
chosen only after prolonged debate." Id.
327. Id. (finding the standard-setting organization members in weighing different alter-
natives considered the potential cost of patents as material: "JEDEC members-DRAM
manufacturers and customers-were highly sensitive to costs, and that keeping costs down
was a major concern within JEDEC"). According to a report by Rambus, "Compaq (Dave
Wooten) like the others, stressed that price was the major concern for all of their systems.
They didn't particularly seem to care if the SDRAMs had 1 or two banks so long as they
didn't cost any more than conventional DRAMs .. . Sun echoed the concerns about low
cost. They really hammered on that point." Id.
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The court in Rambus also erred in assuming that a monopolist that uses
deception to obtain higher prices "has no particular tendency to exclude
rivals and, thus, to diminish competition." 3 2 8 First, the Sherman Act
reaches non-exclusionary behavior that enables a monopolist to increase
price. When a company obtains or maintains its monopoly power not as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen or historic accident,
but by deception (such as misrepresenting its intentions to the standard-
setting organization), then its conduct is "willful" and illegal. 329 Second,
deception that significantly distorts demand undermines competition. As
John Vickers said,
Competition cannot work effectively unless customers are reasona-
bly well informed about the choices before them. Uninformed choice
is not effective choice, and without that there will not be effective
competition. Informed choice has two elements-knowing what al-
ternatives there are, and knowing about the characteristics of alter-
native offerings. In particular, what matters is the ability of
customers to judge the prospective value for money, for them, of the
alternatives on offer.330
The D.C. Circuit's causation standard in Rambus raises significant rule-
of-law concerns. It requires the parties and lower courts to speculate on
328. Rambus v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The D.C. Circuit also said that
higher monopoly prices would attract, not repel, competitors. Id. at 466. This supposition
first is inapplicable to markets with strong network effects (enhanced by the adoption of a
standard) and where a patent protects the monopoly, and second, rests on the Chicago
School theory that rational profit-maximizers, who are attracted to industries characterized
with supra-competitive profits, quickly defeat the exercise of market power. In fact market
power can persist in markets characterized with low entry barriers. See Amanda P. Reeves
& Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582720; Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute
Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 514-17 [hereinafter Stucke, Monopolies]; Stucke,
supra note 167, at 563-72. In Conwood, for example, the moist snuff monopoly had the
highest profit margin in the country, and increased prices approximately eight to ten per
cent annually between 1979 and 1998; yet the annual price increases and large profit mar-
gin did not attract any entry after 1990. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768,
775 (6th Cir. 2002).
329. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting
that deceptive conduct served "to protect its monopoly ... in a manner not attributable"
either to product's superiority or to business acumen and "therefore was anticompetitive");
Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 798 (N.D. Tex. 2008)
(applying Grinnell standard to deception in standard-setting organization) (citing United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). Also suppose a firm with a 75%
market share acquires a smaller rival with a 10% share. The merger enables the monopo-
list to raise prices further. The merger is not exclusionary with respect to the remaining
competitors in the market. But nonetheless it violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act (as
well as Section 7 of the Clayton Act). Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
134-35 (1969); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Golden Grain Maca-
roni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Daily Gazette Co., 567
F. Supp. 2d 859, 863-64 (S.D. W. Va. 2008). So if a merger (which depending on the
circumstances can generate efficiencies) that leads to higher prices violates Section 2, it
follows that deception (which lacks any efficiencies) that leads to higher prices also violates
Section 2.
330. John Vickers, Chairman, Office of Fair Trading, Economics for Consumer Policy,
British Academy Keynes Lecture (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/
shared-oft/speeches/spe0403.pdf.
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"the world that would have existed but for [the monopolist's] decep-
tion."331 How can one objectively and predictably determine what would
happen in an alternate universe? Moreover, the Rambus causation stan-
dard is inimical to the Sherman Act's purpose. It allows a company to
gain an unfair advantage over its competitors by willfully and intention-
ally deceiving the standard-setting organization about its highly material
intellectual property, based on the possibility that absent the deception,
the organization might have adopted the technology anyway. It also per-
mits a monopolist to deceive consumers into making uninformed choices
and thereby reap greater profits at the consumers' expense. 332
D. OTHER DECEPTIVE CONDUCT BY A MONOPOLIST
As the prior sections discuss, deception at critical junctures can sub-
stantially lessen competition. "[U]nethical and deceptive practices," the
Court recognized, "can constitute abuses of administrative or judicial
processes that result in antitrust violations."3 33 One well-recognized ex-
ample is when a patentee procures a patent by fraud, and thereafter seeks
monopoly rents from its ill-gotten patent,334 or when branded drug manu-
facturers deceive the regulatory U.S. Food and Drug Administration to
block generic entry.335
331. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466-67.
332. The D.C. Circuit also criticized the FTC for not citing (or distinguishing) NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc. Id. at 466. The court was under the misimpression that NYNEX
somehow held that a monopolist's use of deception to obtain higher prices falls outside the
antitrust laws. Id. at 464-65. The sole issue in NYNEX was "whether the antitrust rule
that group boycotts are illegal per se as set forth in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc... . applies to a buyer's decision to buy from one seller rather than another, when that
decision cannot be justified in terms of ordinary competitive objectives." 525 U.S. 128, 130
(1998). The Court held that its per se group boycott rule did not apply to instances where a
single buyer favors one seller over another, albeit for an improper reason. Id. The Court
specifically refused Defendants-Petitioners' request "to reach beyond the 'per se' issues
and to hold that Discon's complaint does not allege anywhere that their purchasing deci-
sions harmed the competitive process itself and, for this reason, it should be dismissed."
Id. at 140. The Court never held that a monopolist under the Sherman Act could employ
deception to secure higher prices. Id. Such a holding would be plainly inconsistent with
the Sherman Act's legislative aim and its precedent. See supra Part II.A. Instead the D.C.
Circuit latched on to some dictum in NYNEX. In passing, the Court accepted that the
defendants' regulatory scam had injured consumers by raising telephone service rates.
NYNEX Corp., 525 U.S. at 129. But "that consumer injury naturally flowed not so much
from a less competitive market for removal services, as from the exercise of market power
lawfully in the hands of a monopolist, New York Telephone, combined with a deception
worked upon the regulatory agency that prevented the agency from controlling [New York
Telephone's] exercise of monopoly power." Id. at 136. This dictum does not support the
holding that a monopolist's deception to secure higher prices is generally permissible under
the Sherman Act. Not all monopolists' prices are regulated. In an unregulated environ-
ment, monopolists presumably charge the profit-maximizing price. If a monopolist secures
higher prices by deception, that must mean that the deception increased its market power.
Besides, Rambus was using deception to attain, not maintain, a monopoly.
333. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
334. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173-79
(1965).
335. Creighton et al., supra note 33, at 983-85 (describing FTC challenges).
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Deception in other contexts can also be anticompetitive. Sun
Microsystems's Java technologies, for example, threatened Microsoft's
operating systems monopoly. 336 To defend its monopoly, Microsoft
deceived the independent software developers. 337 Microsoft publicly
agreed to promote its competitor's cross-platform technologies and coop-
erate with Sun.3 3 8 The monopolist lured independent software develop-
ers to use Microsoft's software development tools in designing Java
applications. 339 Based on Microsoft's representations, the independent
software vendors thought Microsoft's tools were for cross-platform appli-
cations, and thus could be used on any computer with Java technology,
not just computers with Microsoft's operating systems.340 Unbeknownst
to the vendors, "Microsoft's tools included 'certain "keywords" and
"compiler directives"' that only Microsoft's version of Java could execute
properly. 341 Thus, the deceived Java developers "ended up producing ap-
plications that would run only on [Microsoft's Windows] operating sys-
tem." 342 Microsoft publicly denied the accusation, but its internal
documents showed the contrary: Microsoft intended to deceive Java de-
velopers. 343 Its deception would lead to Windows-dependent Java appli-
cations, thereby blunting Java's threat to its operating system
monopoly. 3"
Microsoft, alleged a class of computer software buyers, engaged in
other deceptive business practices.345 To inhibit competition and techno-
logical development, the monopolist allegedly created "an 'applications
barrier' in its Windows software that, unbeknownst to consumers, re-
jected competitors' Intel-compatible [personal computer] operating sys-
tems."346 Such deception, plaintiffs' alleged, resulted in inflated prices
for Microsoft's products and denied consumers access to competitors' in-
336. Microsoft's Holy War on Java, CNET NEWS (Sept. 23, 1998 5:00 AM), http://news.
cnet.com/Microsofts-holy-war-on-Java/2009-1001-3-215854.html. With Java, Sun sought to
develop a computer programming language that would run on multiple computer plat-
forms. Id. "In theory, Java could allow computer users to run Web browsers, word proces-
sors, and numerous other applications without the need of [Microsoft's operating system]
Windows, a scenario that [Microsoft] chairman and chief executive Bill Gates once said
'scares the hell out of me,' according to email Sun subpoenaed from Microsoft." Id.







344. Id. at 76-77.
345. Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 778 N.Y.S.2d 147, 147 (App. Div. 2004).
346. Id. And "to steer consumers" towards its Internet Explorer browser and away
from the competing Navigator browser, Microsoft, plaintiffs alleged, "deliberately engi-
neered a malfunction into Windows 95 . . . when using any other browser, such as Naviga-
tor." Cox v. Microsoft Corp., No. 105193/2000, 2005 WL 3288130, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July
29, 2005). "The purpose of this engineered defect was to deceive consumers into believing
that any dysfunction with other browsers, such as Netscape, was attributable to defects in
[the competitor's] browser software." Id.
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novations, services, and products. 34 7 The New York appellate court held
that plaintiffs' allegations stated a claim under the state UDAP law, and
did not dismiss the complaint.348 Microsoft eventually settled.3 4 9
In all of these cases, the courts had little difficulty concluding that the
monopolist's deception could be anticompetitive. 3 5 0 But the D.C. Circuit
in Microsoft applied a structured rule-of-reason standard, whereby
Microsoft could proffer a procompetitive explanation for its deception
(which it did not).351 Had Microsoft offered such an explanation, then
the antitrust plaintiff, under the rule-of-reason standard, would have to
demonstrate that lesser restrictive alternatives existed or that the decep-
tion's anticompetitive harm outweighed its procompetitive benefits. 3 5 2
This is wasteful. If a monopolist intentionally engages in independently
wrongful anticompetitive conduct, courts need not assess its net competi-
tive effect under a rule-of-reason standard.
IV. A "QUICK-LOOK" STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
DECEPTIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
As Part III discussed, the federal courts use different legal standards to
evaluate a monopolist's deception. A skeptic might agree that the causa-
tion standard in Rambus and the Treatise's six elements for deceptive
advertising suffer from infirmities, but conclude that they remain better
than the lower courts' rambling through the full-blown rule-of-reason
analysis for Section 2 monopolization claims.353 A defendant at least can
minimize costs by limiting discovery to the Treatise's six elements.
This Part offers an alternative legal standard that minimizes the risks of
false positives and false negatives and that is consistent with the Sherman
Act's legislative policies. Courts can employ the following "quick-look"
legal standard: if a monopolist's deceit reasonably appears capable of
making a significant contribution to its attaining or maintaining monop-
oly power, then a prima facie violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
has been established.
Under this quick-look standard, a plaintiff must show first that the
company is a monopolist. Second, antitrust plaintiffs must prove deceit,
347. Cox, 788 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
348. Id.
349. Under the "platform neutral" settlement, class members could obtain "up to $350
million in vouchers" redeemable for cash against purchases of different "hardware or
software manufactured or sold by Microsoft or by many other companies, including com-
panies such as Apple, Dell, or Epson." See Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 5-6, Cox v.
Microsoft Corp, 850 N.Y.S.2d 103 (App. Div. 2008) (No. 2703), 2007 WL 5917819 at *5-6.
350. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
173 (1965) (holding that the "maintenance and enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud"
may serve as the basis of a Section 2 claim).
351. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
352. Id. at 58-59.
353. For greater detail on the shortcomings of the Supreme Court's rule-of-reason stan-
dard, its failure to provide a workable "quick-look" standard, and several ways to improve
the Court's antitrust's legal standards, see Stucke, Rule of Reason, supra note 17; Stucke,
Monopolies, supra note 328, at 534-42.
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which, at a minimum, requires proof of scienter and materiality. The
Sixth Circuit expressed concern that antitrust liability for "merely poten-
tially misleading" or "true but misleading statements" might chill
procompetitive conduct.354 Under this Article's and the courts' current
standard for evaluating vaporware, an antitrust plaintiff must prove the
monopolist's scienter (which by definition should exclude innocent, but
mistaken, statements). Thus, the scienter element should reduce the risk
of false positives (and mitigate the risk of hindsight bias).
Third, the antitrust plaintiff must prove causation. A firm with market
power might violate many laws that
have little or nothing to do with its position in the market: an agricul-
tural firm might fail to comply with safety or cleanliness standards
applicable to food processing; a computer processor firm might vio-
late employment discrimination laws; a pharmaceutical firm might
run afoul of the Food and Drug Administration's rules for approval
of new drugs.355
So even if a defendant's conduct is borderline deceptive, and the fact
finder erroneously finds scienter, the antitrust plaintiff must establish that
the monopolist's deception is capable of significantly contributing to its
attaining or maintaining monopoly power. This causation standard ad-
dresses the "key problem" for the Treatise, namely "assessing the connec-
tion between any improper representations and the speaker's monopoly
power."3 5 6 An antitrust plaintiff claiming monetary damages must also
prove an antitrust injury (which generally requires a showing that the
statement actually deceived market participants). 35 7
This third element distinguishes antitrust violations from ordinary torts.
A defamation action against Microsoft for content on its message board is
not an antitrust action, since the deceit is incapable of significantly con-
tributing to Microsoft's attaining or maintaining its monopoly.3 5 8 But
when Microsoft deceived Java developers to thwart a competitor and
maintain its monopoly, as the D.C. Circuit found, it violated the Sherman
Act.359
354. Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric
Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 371 n.7 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Patricia Schultheiss & William
E. Cohen, Cheap Exclusion: Role & Limits 12-13 (F.T.C. Jan. 14, 2009) (unpublished pa-
per), http://www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2cheapexclusion.pdf (collecting
some panelists' concerns at agencies' Section 2 hearings that challenging borderline state-
ments, which are not literally false, may chill truthful advertising).
355. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that
these violations are too attenuated to support an antitrust claim).
356. TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 782, at 327.
357. See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of
Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit dismissed
plaintiff's Lanham Act claim when plaintiff failed to offer adequate proof that consumers
were actually deceived by defendant's ambiguous or true-but-misleading statements. Id.
358. See, e.g., Eckert v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-11888, 2007 WL 496692, at *3-4 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 13, 2007).
359. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Some may question whether this standard is indeed a "quick-look"
when the court must determine monopoly power, which generally "re-
quires the definition of relevant product and geographic markets, [and] is
the most elusive and unreliable aspect of antitrust enforcement." 36 0 But
courts can dismiss antitrust complaints that fail to adequately plead these
three elements. If the complaint survives a motion to dismiss, the court
can lessen the discovery burdens by scheduling discovery initially on the
second and third elements and entertain a summary judgment motion
(before addressing the issue of monopoly power).361
A. THE STANDARD'S ADVANTAGES IN EVALUATING A
MONoPoLIST's DECEIT
The proposed standard, consistent with rule-of-law principles, pro-
motes (1) accuracy, (2) administrability, (3) consistency and objectivity,
and (4) applicability and transparency.
1. Accuracy
The standard minimizes the risks of false positives and negatives. One
general concern is that the prospect of treble antitrust damages may chill
procompetitive behavior.362 But in assessing the risk of false positives,
competition authorities must distinguish between socially undesirable
conduct generally, and conduct that is undesirable only when undertaken
by a monopolist. For the former, there is little, if any, risk of false posi-
tives. As a DOJ antitrust official during the Kennedy administration said,
"[r]ealistically, the antitrust law is always concerned with a pragmatic
judgment about the reasonableness of trade practices from the social
viewpoint." 363 Society generally seeks to deter socially undesirable con-
duct (such as deception, physical violence, and other well-established tor-
tious or illegal conduct). Overall, it does not matter whether a
monopolist or fringe firm engages in such behavior. The issue is whether
the fraud victim can recover under the Sherman Act.
The risk of false positives for evaluating deception claims is not inher-
ently greater than for other challenged restraints (which depending on
the circumstances can be procompetitive). Unlike bundled discounts,
predatory pricing, and other alleged monopolistic conduct, courts rou-
tinely address claims of deception in different contexts. The common law
prohibition against deception has been in force for centuries. 364 If courts
360. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 825 (1987).
361. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2), 26(d)(2); MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 30.1 (2004).
362. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998) ("To apply the per se
rule here . . . would transform cases involving business behavior that is improper for vari-
ous reasons, say, cases involving nepotism or personal pique, into treble-damages antitrust
cases."); Schultheiss & Cohen, supra note 354, at 10 (collecting concerns from some panel-
ists at agencies' Section 2 hearings).
363. Lee Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 23, 29 (1964).
364. See supra Part I.B.
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still have difficulties adjudicating deception claims, this calls into question
the judiciary's general competence to resolve disputes.
So the concern about false positives does not adhere to claims of de-
ception generally. Instead, the concern implicitly assumes that antitrust
plaintiffs somehow have an easier ride with a deception claim under the
Sherman Act than under the common law or statutes prohibiting de-
ceit.3 6 5 No empirical evidence supports this claim.3 6 6
The standard also minimizes the risk of false negatives. For example,
in Caribbean Broadcasting System, Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C.,367 the
plaintiff's radio station entered the market to compete against defend-
ants' radio station in the Eastern Caribbean. Plaintiff alleged that the
defendants, among other things, deceived advertisers by misrepresenting
that their radio station's signal reached the entire Caribbean; therefore,
advertisers need not deal with the new entrant.368 Defendants allegedly
succeeded in blocking for over two years "plaintiffs' entry into the rele-
vant Eastern Caribbean broadcasting market"; the defendants used this
delay to establish their radio station "as the dominant vehicle by which
U.S. companies advertised their goods in the Eastern Caribbean." 369 The
plaintiff alleged that U.S. advertisers from the 1980s through the time of
appeal in the late 1990s remained unaware of the defendants'
deception. 370
Under the Treatise's presumption and six-element standard, the mo-
nopolist need not fear antitrust liability for its deception.371 No doubt the
advertisers (which included Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, K-
Mart, Radio Shack, and Xerox) 372 had knowledge about the relevant ad-
vertising market and the advertising vehicles in those markets. These ad-
vertisers could have uncovered this deception by personally touring (or
surveying residents throughout) the Caribbean. In addition, the plaintiff
could have neutralized these misrepresentations. For example, the plain-
365. See TREATISE, supra note 111, 1 782, at 321 (expressing concern that plaintiffs "are
often less disciplined in making tort-like claims in antitrust suits than in tort suits").
366. See, e.g., supra Part II.A (discussing hurdles that some courts have needlessly er-
ected for antitrust plaintiffs to overcome).
367. 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
368. Id.; Final Brief for Appellant at 16-17, Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable &
Wireless, PLC, 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 96-7246), 1997 WL 34647759 (alleging
that defendants' anticompetitive activities included (1) defendants "pervasive manipula-
tion and misuse of BVI regulatory processes through misrepresentations and sham objec-
tions to the BVI authorities regarding CBS's license applications, particularly objections
that C&W knew or should have known were entirely baseless at the time they were as-
serted, all with the purpose and effect of delaying CBS's entry into competition with
CCC"; and (2) "CCC's pervasive misrepresentations to U.S. advertisers of Radio GEM's
coverage and reach, beginning prior to CBS's market entry and continuing to the present,
all with the purpose and effect of misleading said advertisers into establishing relationships
with CCC prior to CBS's market entry and foreclosing CBS from thereafter obtaining such
relationships for CBS").
369. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 368.
370. Id.
371. See TREATISE, supra note 111, 782, at 326-31.
372. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 368.
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tiff could have provided advertisers survey data that showed that the de-
fendants' radio station did not reach the entire Caribbean.
Rather than dismiss plaintiff's advertising claim, Judge Douglas Gins-
burg, writing for the D.C. Circuit, recognized that if plaintiff proved at
trial that defendants' alleged conduct was indeed deceitful and anticom-
petitive, then such conduct fell within the category of anticompetitive
conduct prohibited under the Sherman Act.3 73
2. Administrability
Many courts recognize that fraudulent misrepresentations to secure or
maintain a monopoly violate the antitrust laws and should be punished.
Courts already employ the proposed quick-look standard for vaporware
claims. For false advertising claims, courts, without relying on the TREA-
TISE, have little difficulty dismissing antitrust claims where the alleged
statements are not deceptive 374 or do not reasonably appear capable of
making a significant contribution to the defendant's maintaining or at-
taining monopoly power.375
Likewise courts in the three circuits that apply the Treatise's legal stan-
dard could have as easily dismissed those cases where plaintiffs, for exam-
ple, failed to present evidence of actual deception. 376
3. Standard Is Objective and Should Yield More Predictable Results
Not only is the quick-look standard easier to apply than the Treatise's
six elements, it should yield more predictable results, as it requires less
subjective input from the court. In applying the Treatise's elements,
courts could differ over whether the representation is "clearly" false or
material (or simply false and material), whether the length of time is suf-
ficiently long to constitute a "prolonged" period, or whether other com-
373. Caribbean Broad. Sys., 148 F.3d at 1087.
374. See, e.g., Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 484 (5th Cir. 2000) ("sham
pricing was not predatory because it was not deceptive or fraudulent"); Brookeside Ambu-
lance Serv., Inc. v. Walker Ambulance Serv., Inc., No. 93-4135, 1994 WL 592941, at *3 (6th
Cir. Oct. 26, 1994) (recognizing that deception could be anticompetitive but no evidence
that defendant made alleged misrepresentations); Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d
924, 930 (4th Cir. 1990); Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Leavitt, 865 F. Supp. 951, 964 (D. Mass. 1994)
(holding that one negative statement to a customer was not defamatory); EventMedia Int'l,
Inc. v. Time Inc. Magazine Co., No. 92 Civ. 0502 (JFK), 1992 WL 321629, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 26, 1992); U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1183
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
375. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co., 405 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (W.D. Wis. 2005)
(antitrust complainant conceded that allegedly misleading horsepower rating by itself did
not violate antitrust laws); Picker Int'l, Inc., 865 F. Supp. at 964 (finding that there was no
showing of causation as customer testified that none of the alleged monopolist's statements
caused him to change his mind).
376. See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of
Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2003); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google,
Inc., No. C-06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Applera
Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345-46 (D. Conn. 2004); Multivideo Labs,
Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 99-CIV-3908(DLC), 2000 WL 12122, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2000).
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petitors could readily neutralize the falsehood (an inquiry that can
potentially impose needless discovery costs on third-party businesses).
Currently, the litigation's outcome depends on which standard the
court employs. So the results can be inconsistent. For example, in Wal-
green Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P., the district court con-
cluded, in applying the Treatise's elements, that doctors categorically
could not be deceived.377 But the Third Circuit, on the facts of In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, concluded that doctors could be
deceived in at least some circumstances. 378 For over thirty years, Du-
Pont's Coumadin product (its brand name for warfarin sodium) "domi-
nated the oral anti-coagulant market."37 9 DuPont, however, anticipated
losing market share "from the introduction of a cheaper generic [drug]
substitute for Coumadin."380 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration
found that the generic drug "was bioequivalent and . . . therapeutically
equivalent to [DuPont's] Coumadin." 381 But "to deter doctors, pharma-
cists, [third-party payors,] and consumers from switching to the generic
drug," DuPont allegedly orchestrated a campaign disparaging generic
substitutes generally and plaintiff's warfarin sodium particularly.382 The
effect of DuPont's disparagement campaign was allegedly to raise the ge-
neric manufacturer's costs to enter the anti-coagulant market and to
thwart its market penetration.383 Despite pharmacists' and doctors'
knowledge of the subject matter, "some pharmacies, including some large
chains, refused to substitute the generic for Coumadin out of a mistaken
belief that generic warfarin sodium was not equivalent to Coumadin"-at
least one physician's group instructed its "patients to take only the brand
name Coumadin." 384 DuPont later settled with the generic drug manu-
facturer385 and with a class of consumers and third-party payors for $44.5
million.38 6
377. 534 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (stating that prescription drug sales "necessarily depended
on prescriptions written by medical professionals, that is, persons knowledgeable of the
subject matter").
378. In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig. (Warfarin 1), 214 F.3d 395, 397 (3d Cir.
2000).
379. Id. at 396.
380. Id. at 397.
381. In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig. (Warfarin If), 212 F.R.D. 231, 241 (D. Del.
2002).
382. Id. at 241, 248.
383. Id. at 292. To show "that defendant's misrepresentations had their desired effect,
plaintiffs cited the weak market penetration of generic warfarin sodium." Id. Generally
about 40% to 70% "of prescriptions for drugs available from multiple sources are filled
with less expensive generics within one year of" the generic drug's availability. Id. But
DuPont's Coumadin filled more than 75% of prescriptions for sodium warfarin "a year
after Barr introduced its generic version, and DuPont continued to maintain a [67%] mar-
ket share up" to when the antitrust complaint was filed. Id.
384. Id.
385. Warfarin 1, 214 F.3d at 397 n.2.
386. Warfarin II, 212 F.R.D. at 261.
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4. Transparency and Broad Applicability
The proposed quick-look standard and its objectives are understanda-
ble as the standard employs the concepts of deceit and causation, which
courts apply across many areas of law. Unlike the Treatise's six elements
and the Rambus court's "but for" standard for causation,387 the proposed
legal standard is consistent with the aim of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
and laws prohibiting deception generally. Similarly, courts would not
have to employ conflicting presumptions under the Sherman and Lanham
Acts, a scenario that arises when courts apply the Treatise's de minimis
presumption.
Moreover, the standard reaches as wide a scope of conduct as possible.
For example, if a monopolist engages in a media campaign of "fear, un-
certainty and doubt" and vaporware, the court would apply the Treatise's
legal de minimis presumption and six elements to the false advertise-
ments but not necessarily to the vaporware statements in the trade press.
It makes no sense to apply different presumptions of anticompetitive
harm based on whether or not the vaporware and FUD campaign were in
the trade press or in an advertisement. Moreover, as one court recog-
nized, the monopolist's deception should not be viewed in isolation under
the Treatise's elements, but in the context of the other alleged anticompe-
titive behavior.388 The court accordingly can use one legal standard to
evaluate the monopolist's deception across settings.
B. CONCERNS IN CHALLENGING DECEIT UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
No one seriously defends deception. Deception is immoral. For the
agnostic, deception lacks any redeeming economic qualities or cognizable
efficiency justifications. So skeptics, rather than defend deception, argue
that deception should be left to other laws instead. Antitrust courts
should focus instead on anticompetitive restraints that other laws do not
address.
One oft-cited basis for not converting deceitful and other tortious con-
duct into antitrust violations is the concern of creating "'a federal com-
mon law of unfair competition' which was not the intent of the antitrust
laws."389 It is unclear why some courts have resisted a federal common
law of unfair competition when, as the Sherman Act's legislative history
387. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
388. Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (D. Utah 1999).
389. Merkle Press Inc. v. Merkle, 519 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D. Md. 1981) ("Courts must be
circumspect in converting ordinary business torts into violations of the antitrust laws. To
do so would be to 'create a federal common law of unfair competition' which was not the
intent of the antitrust laws."); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (explaining that federal antitrust laws "do not create a
federal law of unfair competition"); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th
Cir. 1979) ("Even the use of unfair business practices as part of the termination may not
invoke sanction under the antitrust laws.").
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shows 3 90 and as the Supreme Court recently reiterated, the federal anti-
trust laws, in fact, represent the federal common law on unfair
competition.391
A second concern is that other laws, such as state "unfair competition"
laws and business torts, already provide remedies for various "competi-
tive practices thought to be offensive to proper standards of business mo-
rality."3 9 2 The antitrust laws, some argue, are not the "panacea for all
evils that may infect business life." 3 9 3 In Conwood, the Sixth Circuit said
that deceptive and other tortious conduct violates the Sherman Act only
in "rare gross cases." 394 A related concern is that with so many other
federal and state criminal and civil statutes to deter and punish deception,
antitrust adds little to the mix.
This concern is justified for independently wrongful acts with no signifi-
cant competitive effects, such as a monopolist defaming its former em-
ployee. But it is illogical to argue that because other statutes address
deceit, such antisocial behavior should be of lesser concern under the
competition laws.3 9 5 The fact that multiple civil and criminal laws pro-
hibit deception reinforces that the conduct lacks any redeeming social
qualities.396 The fact that deception persists despite the many criminal
and civil statutes reflects that no statute by itself can deter deception.
Indeed, if the existing statutes optimally deter deception, why do we still
have deceit? Why in the aftermath of the financial crisis will there likely
be more statutes and higher penalties to punish deceit?3 9 7 Each statute
has limits as to scope, who has standing to sue, the circumstances under
which one can recover for deception, and the remedies. This suggests
that anticompetitive antisocial conduct should be a priority under anti-
trust enforcement, and legal standards should encourage, not discourage,
its prosecution.
Indeed, the U.S. Senate when enacting the Sherman Act rejected the
argument that the Act is cumulative.398 If in 1890 every state's common
law prohibited a monopolist's unfair behavior, inquired Senator Kenna,
"why should this bill proceed to denounce that very monopoly?"399 But
the availability of common law remedies did not render the Sherman Act
390. See supra Part II.A.
391. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (stat-
ing that the Sherman Act from its inception was treated "as a common-law statute"); State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (noting that it is the accepted "view that Congress
'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-
law tradition"').
392. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (quoting TREATISE, supra
note 111, 1 651d, at 78).
393. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288 n.41 (2d Cir. 1979).
394. Conwood, 290 F.3d at 784 (quoting TREATISE, supra note 111, 782(a), at 272).
395. Creighton et al., supra note 33, at 993-94.
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
398. 21 CONG. REc. 3152 (1890).
399. Id.
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with its treble damages, plaintiffs' recovery of their attorneys' fees, and
federal jurisdiction meaningless. Instead, the Sherman Act, responded
Senator Hoar, sought "to extend the common-law principles . .. to inter-
national and interstate commerce in the United States."400
Moreover, the federal antitrust laws offer several benefits in deterring
and punishing deceptive conduct. First, the Sherman Act enables injured
consumers who may lack standing under common law fraud (as they did
not rely on the deception) and other federal and state statutes to enjoin
the anticompetitive deception. 401 Unlike many other statutes, the Sher-
man Act focuses on the deception's impact on competition. 4 0 2 So, for
example, standard-setting "participants often may have little incentive to
complain about [deceptive patent] hold up[s] because they can pass on
the hidden costs . . . to consumers." 403 A second benefit is that the Sher-
man Act can provide broad structural or behavioral remedies to redress
the harms from a monopolist's anticompetitive deception. 4 04 Third, the
possibility that the federal antitrust agencies and injured private plaintiffs
can challenge a monopolist's anticompetitive deception increases
deterrence.
A third concern is that if antitrust plaintiffs can challenge a monopo-
list's deception under the Sherman Act, they have an unfair advantage:
plaintiffs can use the "threat of magnified discovery burdens and treble
damages as added leverage to force [defendants] to settle."405 Let me
address treble damages and abusive discovery separately. It is questiona-
ble whether treble antitrust damages are indeed chilling procompetitive
activity, given the prospect of business torts potentially excessive punitive
damages and multiplied damages for civil RICO and many state UDAP
claims.4 0 6 But if the prospect of treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs
is forcing companies to settle, this is precisely what Congress intended. If
the behavior is independently wrongful and anticompetitive, then "the
purpose of giving private parties treble damage and injunctive remedies
was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high
purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws."4 0 7
400. Id.
401. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
402. See, e.g., Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that
anticompetitive conduct that is not premised on consumer deception is not within the am-
bit of New York's UDAP statute); Schultheiss & Cohen, supra note 354, at 18.
403. PROMOTING INNOVATION & COMPETITION, supra note 31, at 40 (noting some pan-
elists' concerns).
404. Schultheiss & Cohen, supra note 354, at 8.
405. Id. at 11 (collecting concerns from some panelists at agencies' Section 2 hearings).
406. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
262 (1989). A private plaintiff was awarded "$153,438 in treble damages and $212,500 in
attorney's fees and costs on [its attempted monopolization] antitrust claim, or, in the alter-
native, $6,066,082.74 in compensatory and punitive damages on the state-law tortious inter-
ference claim." Id.
407. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); see
also 21 CONG. REc. 2569 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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With respect to the threat of oppressive antitrust discovery, it is true
that defendants, at times, may find it cheaper to settle a strike suit than
engage in the protracted discovery invited under the Supreme Court's
rule-of-reason standard. Consequently, this Article seeks a departure
from the Court's full-blown rule-of-reason analysis and instead encour-
ages courts to employ a simpler legal standard with respect to deception.
The proposed standard enables injured plaintiffs to quickly prosecute a
monopolist's anticompetitive deception. Conduct that is not deceptive or
does not reasonably appear capable of making a significant contribution
to the company's attaining or maintaining monopoly power is not action-
able under Section 2. What exactly is the critics' counterfactual? They
favor either little (if any) antitrust litigation or alternatively that courts
and litigants should remain in litigation's most foul circle of hell-the in-
terminable and costly litigation under the vague rule of reason.
A fourth concern is that a contrary rule requires monopolists to praise
smaller rivals' products or services. 408 Under this logic, monopolists
should be allowed to blow up their competitors' plants, as a contrary rule
would require them to build their competitors' plants. But this concern
raises a more disturbing prejudice-the underlying conception of compe-
tition as zero-sum "warfare." 409 Competition can deliver its bountiful
fruits with its actors behaving civilly. Deception does not yield lower
prices, better products or services, or more informed choice.
CONCLUSION
Prosecuting a monopolist's anticompetitive deception furthers the leg-
islative aims of competition law. Given deception's social and economic
harms, its lack of redeeming economic benefits or cognizable efficiencies,
and the importance of trust in the marketplace, a hard line is warranted.
The danger today is not that courts will punish deception under the
Sherman Act. Rather, the danger is that the courts will not. In advancing
their peculiar social policies on deceptive commercial speech and compe-
tition generally, courts that do not punish a monopolist's anticompetitive
deception contravene the Act's legislative aim. The legal standard for
deceptive advertising in three circuits is based on the Treatise, but neither
the Treatise's de minimis presumption nor its six elements are grounded
in the Sherman Act's text, legislative purpose, or legislative history. In-
stead, the standard represents the views of several respected antitrust
scholars. One jurist (and believer in the Chicago School economic theo-
408. Sanderson v. Culligan Int'l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.);
Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989) ("To
require cooperation or friendliness among rivals is to undercut the intellectual foundations
of antitrust law.").
409. Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399. Defendants in a later case cited the dicta that as a
matter of law efforts to disparage a competitor do not harm competition. Alternative
Electrodes, LLC v. Empi, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The district court
sensibly discounted the dicta, as courts have long recognized that false and misleading
statements may provide a basis for antitrust claims. Id.
[Vol. 631122
2010] How Do Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception? 1123
ries) took a more extreme view. 410 He assumed that the marketplace of
ideas would cure a monopolist's deceptive anticompetitive ads.4 1 1
The concern today is not whether the courts should apply four or six
elements. Courts simply should not erect legal presumptions that frus-
trate the Act's purpose. The Supreme Court's rule-of-reason analysis,
generally, and its monopolization standards, specifically, lead to long liti-
gation times, high costs, and unpredictability. Ideally, enforcers could
quickly prosecute monopolistic conduct as presumptively illegal without
requiring the full-blown rule-of-reason analysis. Toward that end, this ar-
ticle's legal framework can help courts, injured plaintiffs, and the compe-
tition authorities target a monopolist's anticompetitive deception, which
courts should treat as a prima facie violation of Section 2 without requir-
ing a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis or an arbitrary, multi-factor
standard.
410. Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399.
411. See, e.g., id. at 397. In Schachar, eight ophthalmologists contended that defendant
"violated the antitrust laws by attaching the label 'experimental' to radial keratotomy, a
surgical procedure for correcting nearsightedness." Id. The Seventh Circuit could have
rejected summarily the antitrust claim: plaintiffs never demonstrated that the challenged
statement was false. Id. at 399-400. Instead, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court,
asserted even if the statement were false or misleading, the appropriate "remedy is not
antitrust litigation but more speech-the marketplace of ideas." Id. at 400. In another
case, the plaintiff never showed that the defendant even uttered the allegedly deceptive
statements. Sanderson, 415 F.3d at 623. But Judge Easterbrook, again writing for the
court, expanded on his social philosophies: Deception "just set the stage for competition in
a different venue: the advertising market." Id.
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